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The United States Navy is bound by federal law to annually submit a long-range plan for 
the construction of naval vessels. As the report represents a possible vision of the future 
fleet, there is much discussion on its contents and how and why the Navy settled on the 
numbers contained in the proposal. Viewing the plan as a decision reached by a 
government entity allows a thorough investigation of the matter utilizing Graham 
Allison’s approach from his work, Essence of Decision. Through the lenses of rational 
actor model, organizational behavior model, and government politics model, the Annual 
Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2015 will be analyzed to 
better understand the requirements, organizational routines, major players, and special 
interests that ultimately result in a plan submitted to congress. Through this analysis, a 
better understanding of the processes, procedures and inner workings of the Navy will 
become apparent and show the FY2015 Long Range Plan is rather complex and beholden 
to many stakeholders, each wishing to exert influence over the outcome.   
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A. WHAT IS A SHIP ANYWAY? 
In March of 2014 the Navy updated a Secretary of the Navy instruction 
(SECNAV) on “General Guidance for the Classification of Naval Vessels and Battle 
Force Ship Counting Procedures” (Secretary of the Navy, 2014). It had been just over 
three years since the last update to this instruction but many outside of the Navy were 
unhappy with the change (Freedberg, 2014d). Under the new instruction and counting 
rules, the Navy immediately added 10 ships to its Battle Force inventory bringing that 
number to a grand total of 290. Much of the controversy arose because the new method 
moves to include hospital ships that have no offensive capability in the battle force count. 
Opponents of the change argued that a ship that cannot fight should not be counted. 
With a target goal of 306 ships, these new counting rules appeared to give the sea 
service a quick boost towards its goal. Unfortunately, the remaining gap can only be 
filled by long term ship acquisition. Because ships are both costly and require a long time 
to build, the Navy plans 30 fiscal years (FY) in advance to meet its requirements. Each 
year, it is legally required to submit a long range proposal for the construction of naval 
vessels to the Congress (Long-range plan for construction of naval vessels, 2010). This 
long range or “30-year” shipbuilding plan outlines the types of ships being procured as 
well as potential pitfalls in the plan. Yet just like the change in ship counting rules, the 
30-year plan is often full of political bickering. The Navy must balance the requirements 
set forth in guiding national security documents with the fiscal environment and the need 
to maintain certain core capabilities both inside and outside of the Navy. Historically, this 
plan has been criticized for having too favorable an outlook on future cost or failing to 
actually achieve the Navy’s target battle force inventory. Therefore, an important 
question to ask is “Why and how did the Navy arrive at and settle on the Annual Long-
Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2015?” That is the question that this 
thesis endeavors to answer.  
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B. HOW TO ANALYZE A DECISION 
Graham Alison broke new ground with his book Essence of Decision about the 
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis (1971). In his work, he developed a new methodology of 
evaluating and understanding decisions. Years later, a second edition partnering with 
Phillip Zelikow provided even more insight into what happened behind closed doors in 
the White House. Graham looked at three different decisions made during the crisis: Why 
did the Soviet Union place strategic offensive missiles in Cuba? Why did the United 
States respond with a naval quarantine of Soviet shipments to Cuba? Why did the Soviets 
withdraw their missiles (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). Historically, these questions have 
been answered with a “Rational Actor” decision approach allowing the United States and 
the Soviet Union to act as independent actors with unified purpose and intention. Allison 
devised a method by which he would ask the same questions but attempt to answer them 
with two additional decision models; an organizational behavior (OB) model and a 
government politics (GP) model.  
Using Essence of Decision as a template, the current 30-year ship construction 
plan was analyzed through the three decision models (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). The 
most recent plan submitted by the Navy to Congress is formally known as the Annual 
Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2015 but will be referred to as 
the FY2015 Long Range Plan for the remainder of this thesis (Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations [Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8)], 2014). The mention or 
analysis of previous plans will utilize the appropriate FY to ensure there is no confusion 
(Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Integration of Capabilities and Resources)(N8), 
2013) (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Integration of Capabilities and Resources) 
(N8), 2012). 
C. DEFINING A DECISION 
In order to effectively apply the three models to the FY2015 Long Range Plan, it 
must first be viewed as a decision. Therefore, part of this thesis will also define the 
FY2015 Long Range Plan as a standalone decision. Using research from Lori Franz and 
Michael Kramer (2010), the aspects and characteristics of the decision will be examined 
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and discussed to better understand the importance of the document and better understand 
how the three models will reveal different characteristics. 
D. END STATE 
Ultimately, the goal of this thesis is a better understanding of how the Navy 
balances multiple commitments and still completes its mission. In a world where money 
is extremely tight and operational requirements extremely demanding, designing an 
effective shipbuilding plan is no small feat. Hopefully, the three decision lenses will 
allow anyone interested in the Navy’s future to see beyond the numbers and understand 
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II. EXPLANATION OF THE 30-YEAR SHIPBUILDING PLAN 
A. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 
The requirement of the Navy to provide Congress with a long range shipbuilding 
plan is codified in title 10 of USC. (Long-range plan for construction of naval vessels, 
2010) 
§ 231. Long-range plan for construction of naval vessels 
(a) QUADRENNIAL NAVAL VESSEL CONSTRUCTION PLAN—At the same time that the 
budget of the President is submitted under section 1105(a) of title 31 
during each year in which the Secretary of Defense submits a quadrennial 
defense review, the Secretary of the Navy shall submit to the 
congressional defense committees a long-range plan for the construction 
of combatant and support vessels for the Navy that supports the force 
structure recommendations of the quadrennial defense review. 
Beyond the quote above, section 231 has several subsections outlining additional 
requirements. The first among these outlines the planning timeline. The Navy is required 
to provide a “detailed construction schedule of naval vessels for the 10-year period 
beginning on the date on which the plan is submitted” (Long-range plan for construction 
of naval vessels, 2010). Beyond that the next 10 years should provide a “probable 
construction schedule” and the final 10 years need only be a “notional construction 
schedule” (Long-range plan for construction of naval vessels, 2010). 
The next requirement outlined is arguably one of the most challenging and 
provides the most constraint: funding. Each one of the 10 year planning periods needs to 
have its own assessment with regard to annual funding necessary to carry out the 
construction schedule. Furthermore, the Director of Cost Assessment and Program 
Evaluation must evaluate any potential risks associated with the schedule including 
anything relating to “operational plans, missions deployment schedules and fulfillment of 
the requirements of the combatant commanders” (Long-range plan for construction of 
naval vessels, 2010). 
Section 231 also addresses the need that the plan be in accordance with section 
5062(b) of title 10 which states: 
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(b) The naval combat forces of the Navy shall include not less than 11 
operational aircraft carriers. For purposes of this subsection, an 
operational aircraft carrier includes an aircraft carrier that is temporarily 
unavailable for worldwide deployment due to routine or scheduled 
maintenance or repair. 
There is also an allowance for the times when the budget assessment is not 
favorable to completing the shipbuilding plan: 
(d) ASSESSMENT WHEN BUDGET IS INSUFFICIENT.— If the budget for a fiscal year 
provides for funding of the construction of naval vessels at a level that is 
less than the level determined necessary by the Director of Cost 
Assessment and Program Evaluation under subsection (b)(5), the 
Secretary of the Navy shall include with the defense budget materials for 
that fiscal year an assessment that describes and discusses the risks 
associated with the budget, including the risk associated with a reduced 
force structure that may result from funding naval vessel construction at 
such a level. 
The remaining portion of section 231 outlines requirements from the 
Congressional Budget Office to report on the Navy’s plan as well as the procedures to be 
followed should the number need to be modified. 
B. FY2015 CURRENT SHIPBUILDING PLAN 
When the Navy released its FY2015 Long Range Plan, the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, the Honorable Robert O. Work, provided a cover letter to each chairman and 
ranking member of the Congressional Armed Service and Appropriations Committees. 
The letter is slightly longer than one page and addresses the major aspects of the plan. 
Mr. Work highlights the plans commitments to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 
and Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) but quickly addresses his concerns over the 
Budget Control Act of 2011 and the potential impact it would have on the plan. The 
cover letter closes by quickly addressing the new method of ship counting and a 
commitment to continue his work with the Navy in order to arrive at the appropriate 
number of vessels 
The FY2015 Long Range Plan is broken into nine parts with five appendices. The 
chapters are well organized and comply with the legal requirements set forth in Title 10, 
section 231. The table of contents can be viewed in Figure 1. The outline of the document 
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is similar to previous years but for FY2015 does not contain an executive summary and 
contains additional appendices to further highlight potential issues. 
 
 
Figure 1.  FY2015 Long Range Plan Table of Contents (from Deputy Chief of 
Naval Operations [Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8)], 2014) 
The first two parts of the plan highlight the legal requirements and the guiding 
principles of what the Navy utilized in planning for shipbuilding: the QDR, the DSG and 
the Navy’s own 2012 Force Structure Assessment (FSA). 
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Part three begins to delve more in depth into the new method of ship counting and 
the 2012 FSA. The purpose of the new SECNAV instruction on ship counting rules was 
to better align the battle force with the requirements of the Geographic Combatant 
Commanders which are resourced through the Global Force Management Allocation Plan 
(GFMAP). This move allows some vessels, such as hospital ships and patrol craft, to be 
counted in the battle force inventory based on the recommendation of the Chief of Naval 
Operations and the approval of SECNAV. The new counting rules have had the largest 
impact in the area of the small surface combatant. Traditionally the frigate filled this role 
but due to the retirement of the frigate and the Littoral Combat Ship’s slow integration, 
both patrol craft and mine warfare ships have been added to this number. 
The 2012 FSA was the internal Navy study that determined a requirement of 306 
ships to fully execute its missions. This number has been determined to achieve the 
following: “(1) aligns global presence requirements with national priorities; (2) increases 
forward basing/stationing of ships and systems; (3) improves payload capacity for SSNs 
replacing SSGNs and; (4) increases use of rotational civilian and military crews, 
providing more forward presence per ships” (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
[Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8)], 2014). The breakdown of the 306 ship 
Navy can be seen in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  Breakdown of the 306 ship Navy (from Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations [Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8)], 2014) 
The plan then moves into assumptions and actual numbers of ships it hopes to 
construct and in which FY it expects them to roll out of the shipyards. The plan continues 
by highlighting some of the funding problems with the plan and other potential risks that 
the Navy sees in the future. The appendices provide more detailed breakdown of the 
larger risks inherent in the plan as well as specific discussions on each of the type of ship 
the Navy plans to construct. Of note, Appendix three, the “Estimated Total Cost of 
Construction for Each Vessel Contained in the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction 
of Naval Vessels for FY2015” is of limited Distribution and was unavailable for this 
thesis. 
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C. MAJOR PLAYERS 
The list of stakeholders in the 2015 Long Range Plan is rather large. Of course the 
Navy has the largest stake in the plan, but there are others both inside and out of the Navy 
that zealously monitor the details of the plan. Internally, the Navy’s various communities, 
Aviation, Surface, and Submarine represent their own sub-interests, while N96, Naval 
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), and Fleet Forces work to plan, build and utilize 
future assets respectively. Outside of the Navy the Marine Corps has an interest in seeing 
the continued production of amphibious vessels while various elements of the 
shipbuilding industry all want to land specific Navy contracts. And finally the members 
of Congress hold a large stake in what the Navy chooses to build especially if that 
construction will take place in a Congress-member’s district.  
D. INHERENT CONSTRAINTS OF THE 30 YEAR PLAN 
While it would be easy to say that the Navy needs 600 vessels to fulfil the needs 
of the nation, that number is currently unattainable. The largest constraint inherent in the 
shipbuilding plan is financial. Naval vessels are massively expensive and the Navy 
acknowledges that construction of future vessels could be cost prohibitive. Yet even if 
money were not a problem, there is the inherent constraint of the shipbuilding industry. 
There are only so many shipyards that can construct a nuclear submarine, so throughput 
is limited. Beyond these two constraints is the blessing and curse of technology. As 
technology improves, some argue fewer ships can fulfil the same mission. Yet one ship 
can still only be in one place at any time and so you need many more if you are going to 
project power with a Navy. 
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III. EVALUATION OF THE 30-YEAR PLAN AS A STAND ALONE 
DECISION 
A. WHAT IS A DECISION? 
The Handbook of Decision Making, (Nutt and Wilson, 2010) provides a detailed 
look at the world of decisions. Internal to this work is a chapter examining the various 
dimensions of decisions and providing a way to better classify and understand decisions. 
This chapter, by Franz and Kramer is used below to analyze the 30 year plan. In addition, 
it provides a useful definition of a decision. In this thesis a decision will be defined as “a 
commitment to a future action” (Franz & Kramer, 2010). 
B. THE 30-YEAR PLAN AS A DECISION 
Clearly the FY2015 Long Range Plan meets the definition of a decision. It is also 
important to understand that the action taken by the Navy in the future is not always 
representative of the decision that was presented in the plan. As history has shown, the 
Navy has frequently failed to execute its previous shipbuilding plans (O’Rourke, 2014b). 
Although the Navy does not always fulfill the plan, and the plan evolves year to year, the 
focus of this chapter is on the nature of the decision itself, not whether the Navy 
demonstrated commitment to the plan. Those concerns are discussed in later chapters. 
All sources utilized in this section are reported as described in Franz and Kramer 
(2010). A study by Gorry and Scott Morton (1971) looked to categorize decisions as 
structured, semi-structured or unstructured and then further define organizational 
decisions as a response to “needs for operational control (routine, repetitive, task 
oriented), managerial control (acquiring and using resources to achieve goals), or 
strategic planning (addressing long-term goals and resources)” (Franz & Kramer, 2010). 
In this approach the FY2015 Long Range Plan could be seen as strategic planning to 
manage requirements and goals for the foreseeable future.  
A different view of decisions by J. Frank Yates allows for some overlap in types 
of decisions. His assessment was that there are three types of decisions: choices, 
evaluations, and constructions (Franz & Kramer, 2010).  
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In a choice decision, the decision maker considers a well-defined set of 
alternatives, selecting the best one or more from this set. In an evaluation 
decision, the decision maker determines the worth of alternatives, 
selecting from among those the one(s) with the greatest worth. A 
construction type decision entails the act of designing the best alternative 
given a limited set of resources.  
This view on different types of decisions also fits the FY2015 Long Range Plan well. 
Following this model, the plan would be a construction type decision due to the nature of 
limited resources, though there are also elements of an evaluation decision. The Navy 
knows what it wants to build but is forced to choose between which type of ships it can 
build due to limited funding. This conflict is examined again in later chapters when the 
Navy fights internal struggles over resources and requirements. 
Paul Moody’s work recommends a decision be classified by its importance or 
impact on the stakeholders. Decisions should be evaluated over five factors: magnitude 
and length of commitment, flexibility of the planning involved, goals and premises, 
nature of the data as quantifiable, and finally the measure of the human impact of a 
decision. Moody (1983) also provides tools to better ascertain certain characteristics that 
can help outline a decision: 
(1) How the decision may influence the future (futurity); (2) the difficulty 
by which the decision could be reversed (reversibility); (3) the extent of 
the impact of the decision (impact); (4) the quality of the decision with 
respect to various stakeholders (quality); and (5) the frequency with which 
the decision is made (periodicity). (Franz & Kramer, 2010) 
Subjecting the FY2015 Long Range Plan to Moody’s model suggests a decision 
of extreme importance. The length of commitment is 30 years, the data are easily 
quantifiable, and the potential for human impact is easily huge if the Navy were to find 
itself in a major conflict. On the other side, there is a large sense of flexibility to what the 
Navy can ultimately build in ten years and beyond due to the fact that this plan is revised 
annually. In a political game this flexibility could allow players an “out” – a concept to 
explore during the later chapters. 
Robert Clemen (1996) argues that the difficulty of a decision can primarily be 
traced to its complexity. “Complexity is created when a myriad of issues, data sources 
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and/or stakeholders must be considered, and/or when a large number of alternatives and 
outcomes are possible” (Franz & Kramer, 2010). Often the more complex an issue, the 
more likely analytical studies will be required. Subsequently, a decision can be more 
difficult if there is uncertainty in regard to any data, future events, or outcomes. And 
finally, with more perspectives available and the potential for alternate outcomes based 
on these perspectives, the difficulty level can also be increased. 
Following Clemen, annual shipbuilding plan produced by the Navy checks many, 
if not all of these boxes and could easily be considered a difficult decision. The level of 
analysis put into the decision takes hundreds of full time analysts and action officers and 
the host of issues facing the Navy vastly increases its complexity. Because the Navy 
cannot predict the future levels of funding or the direction a new set of leadership will 
take the defense of the country, the future is often a place requiring much guesswork due 
to its uncertainty. And because there are a host of players involved in the crafting of this 
document, each with a different ideal outcome, the end result is clearly a “hard” decision.  
While every decision has unique qualities, quite often decisions are related to 
other previous or future decisions. An individual decision may be part of a group of 
decisions, or it may be required due to decisions that had been made in the past (Franz & 
Kramer, 2010). In the case of the annual shipbuilding plan, we see a decision that is 
affected by many other decisions outside the scope of this paper. The QDR and DSG 
outline what the plan must contain and strive to support. Funding from Congress puts 
limits on what the Navy can spend and the shipbuilding industry provides a menu of what 
they can actually build. In addition, the frequency of the plan provides an interesting 
descriptor. As an event that is required to repeat each year it is inherently linked to past 
decisions. 
One of the most applicable frameworks to the FY2015 Long Range Plan was 
assembled by John Hammond (1999) in an effort to outline the steps required in making a 
decision. His eight steps included the following; (1) problem definition, (2) decision 
objectives, (3) alternative generation, (4) anticipated outcomes, (5) trade-offs between 
alternatives and outcomes, (6) assessment of uncertainty, (7) risk tolerance, (8) impact on 
related decisions (Franz & Kramer, 2010). This outline closely mirrors the table of 
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contents to the FY2015 Long Range Plan. The purpose of the plan is explained as well as 
the objectives in the opening paragraphs. Further into the document different scenarios 
based on funding are explained and there is an entire section devoted to risk analysis.   
These eight steps indicate a rational decision making process. 
One of the most important aspects of a decision would be its success or failure. 
Unfortunately because this decision spans 30 years it is impossible to measure the 
success of the current plan today. In its place you can look at the quality of the decision. 
Yet with the annual shipbuilding plan, this becomes problematic as well. Comparing a 
decision’s outcome to an expectation prior to making the decision “provided that an 
identifiable goal for the outcome was established prior to the decision” is a method of 
measuring quality proposed by Paul Moody (Franz & Kramer, 2010). In the absence of 
concrete goals the “satisfaction of the decision maker and/or stakeholder” is an 
appropriate substitute. Of course this too is problematic for the Navy when discussing the 
FY2015 Long Range Plan. The Navy as the decision maker may be extremely satisfied 
with the result, but many in Congress (as a stakeholder) may contend that the Navy was 
extremely flawed in its approach (O’Rourke, 2014b). This relates to the problem of 
having so many players in the game and each one hoping for a different outcome.  
Though not currently possible with the FY2015 Long Range Plan it is possible to 
analyze the success of an older 30 year shipbuilding plan along the lines of what Samuel 
Trull (1966) proposed. Viewing success as a factor of decision quality and 
implementation, he argued that a quality decision: fits within operational constraints, is 
completed on time, utilizes appropriate information, is made at the appropriate level, is 
clearly understood by those with the task of implementation, and implementers have the 
means to actually carry it out (Franz & Kramer, 2010). While the FY2015 Long Range 
Plan does meet many of the quality standards that Trull outlines, it is impossible to 
measure its ability to be carried out for the time being. Perhaps in 10 years and after ten 
different iterations, it will be possible to see if the current plan is a “successful decision.”    
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C. HOW TO MOVE FORWARD IN UNDERSTANDING THE DECISION 
The FY2015 Long Range Plan holds many of the characteristics that scholars 
have attributed to decisions. It nicely fits some models proposed while needing some 
adjustment to fit others. The research generally points to the plan as a complex decision 
with significant potential for impact mitigated only by the annual frequency of its 
occurrence. If the planners are unsatisfied with what they have presented, they can 
always adjust the following year.   
While the discussion above has focused on the characteristics of a decision, the 
following chapters will take a different approach. Looking at the FY2015 Long Range 
Plan through three descriptive models will provide a detailed examination of the decision 
process. Each model tells the same story from a different perspective allowing added 
insight regarding the why and how the Navy came to this year’s decision.  
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL 
A. EXPLANATION OF THE RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL 
The first model utilized to analyze the FY2015 Long Range Plan is the classic, or 
Rational Actor Model (RAM). As Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow explain in their 
book, this is the default point of view taken by many when trying to explain the action of 
a government. The model assumes that any action or decision made by a government is 
rational and reflects a unity of action centered on purpose and intention (Allison & 
Zelikow, 1999). Rationality can be viewed as a concept where choices are made 
consistently and at the same time utilize a value maximizing approach. 
Further expanding on the idea of rationality, Allison provides for two types 
utilized by political scientists: comprehensive rationality and bounded rationality. In both 
situations, the actor is understood to review different courses of action and choose the 
path that maximizes utility. Yet in the comprehensive view the actor is able to analyze all 
options, all alternatives and all consequences to make a choice while the bounded 
rationality theory acknowledges the limits of human capabilities, knowledge, and 
capacity. Therefore, bounded rationality allows for some values and beliefs to creep into 
the actor’s decision making. This distinction is important because it allows for actors to 
choose a course of action that others may view as irrational. 
Oftentimes the actions of an actor are represented by some form of 
personification. For example, a headline reading, “US moves Navy ships into the Black 
Sea” implies the U.S. is a rational actor controlling the ships. The United States as a 
whole is viewed as the actor behind the decision when in fact the decision to move the 
vessels may have come at the request of the Navy for an exercise, European Command, 
from the National Security Council, or from the President himself. While the Rational 
Actor model is normally utilized to explain state action, the model will be modified to 
allow a department inside of the government to assume the role of the actor. 
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B. THE NAVY AS A RATIONAL ACTOR 
For the first model applied in this thesis, the United States Navy plays the role of 
rational actor. This view has some precedent that comes from the legal requirement in 
title 10, U.S.C. section 231 that the Navy shall forward its long range construction plan 
annually to the Congress (Long-range plan for construction of naval vessels, 2010). 
When analyzing the decisions and actions of a Rational Actor, Allison provides a 
simplified guide of assumptions to better understand what you are dealing with. The 
following assumptions will be made (Allison & Zelikow, 1999): 
• The FY2015 Long Range Plan is the action of the Navy 
• The Navy is a unified Actor 
• The Navy has a coherent utility function 
• The Navy acts in relation to threats and opportunities 
• The Navy’s action is value maximizing (or expected value maximizing) 
When first reviewing the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval 
Vessels for FY2015 it becomes apparent that the Navy does its absolute best to present a 
cohesive front from which to defend its plan (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
[Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8)], 2014). The plan outlines the 
Department of the Navy’s (DON) position devoid of any evidence of internal discussion 
or conflict. Though there are identified priorities, there is no identified struggle between 
groups inside the Navy. While certain news sources and speeches suggest constant 
political maneuvering inside of the Navy, the Department of Defense, and the Federal 
government as a whole, such politicking are not part of the rational actor assumptions; 
however, these factors will be the discussion of future chapters. 
C. OUTLINE FOR THE RATIONAL ACTOR 
The FY2015 report outlines from the beginning its guidelines and chosen self-
metrics. If we are to view the Navy as a rational actor, these parameters are essential in 
understanding how and why that actor made his decision. It is at this point where the 
methodology developed in Essence of Decision can be employed (Allison & Zelikow, 
1999).  This outline  below has been taken directly from Essence of Decision and then 
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adjusted and compressed to better represent a branch of a government rather than the 
government as a whole. This is essential to emphasize as it better highlights the role the 
Navy has to play in the United States government as a servant to direction from above. 
1. Basic Unit of Analysis: Governmental Action as Choice 
One of the keys to analyzing the actions of a government or a part of a 
government is to assume that the action represents a choice. In this case the Navy made a 
decision with the development of its FY2015 Long-Range plan in order to maximize its 
own internal strategic goals and objectives. These Navy goals and objectives have been 
developed to support overall U.S. national strategy. 
2. Organizational Concepts 
a. Unified Actor 
The agent in this model is the United States Navy. The Navy acts as an individual 
with one mind, one perceived choice, and one estimate of consequences. For the purposes 
of this analysis the internal makeup of the Navy and the external influences still exist, but 
the Navy acts as one mind. It identifies its internal makeup and can assign priority but 
does so rationally with no political infighting or organizational influence. In short, the 
Navy acts as a cohesive unit.   
b. The Problem 
The Navy must provide Congress with a long-range shipbuilding plan while also 
working within provided national defense guidance and within the constraints of the 
budgetary environment. If the requirement was only to provide for a long-range plan then 
there would actually be no problem. Unfortunately the Navy must provide a feasible plan. 
It would be irrational to plan for 10 aircraft carriers to begin production next year when 
there exists only one shipyard capable of producing an aircraft carrier (ACIBC, 2014). 
Nor would a request for 10 aircraft carriers be feasible with the current fiscal 
environment. Therefore, the Navy must endeavor to meet its lawful requirements up 
against tight parameters.   
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c. Action as Rational Choice 
(1) Objectives 
The Navy must comply with the requirements of the 2012 Defense Strategic 
Guidance and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review as well as title 10 of the U.S.C. 
which determines the strategic and statutory basis for a requirement for a Navy that 
provides certain capabilities. 
(2) Options 
Variations in the long range plan constitute the available options. Because the 
long range plan does not allow the Navy to define its role in national defense, these 
variations could manifest themselves as a choice to produce more or less of a certain type 
of vessel so long as they meet the capabilities above. Ultimately, the Navy selects one 
course of action presented in the FY2015 Long Range Plan as the best option, though 
there may be other combinations of ships to meet the requirements.   
(3) Consequences 
Enacting a given choice has distinct consequences expressed in costs and benefits. 
Here, the Navy weighed the costs and benefits of different mixes of naval vessels and 
decided on the makeup presented in the FY2015 Long Range Plan. While deciding to 
produce more SSBN’s, the Navy accepted the added financial cost for the fulfillment of 
requirements outlined by the QDR and DSG. 
(4) Choice 
The rational choice for the Navy is value-maximizing. This model assumes the 
Navy will select the alternative with the highest reward. The FY2015 Long Range Plan 
was selected because it makes the most of a difficult financial situation.   
3. Dominant Inference Pattern 
As Allison and Zelikow explain; “If a nation or its representatives performed a 
particular action, that action must have been selected as the value-maximizing means for 
achieving the actor’s objectives” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999 p. 24).  This idea is the 
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foundation of the RAM. It allows for evaluation of any decision in terms of benefits 
outweighting the costs of one option over any others. 
4. General Propositions 
The likelihood of a course of action derives from the Navy’s: “(1) values and 
objectives, (2) perceived course of action, (3) estimates of consequences (which will 
follow each alternative), and (4) net valuation of each set of consequences. This yields 
two intuitively evident but powerful propositions:” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999) 
• An increase in the perceived costs of an alternative reduces the likelihood 
of that action being chosen. In the case of the Navy this could exhibit itself 
in multiple ways. For example, it is possible that building a new class of 
ship with cutting edge technology would be cost prohibitive such as the 
DDG-1000 Zumwalt class destroyer. 
• A decrease in the perceived costs of an alternative increases the likelihood 
of that action being chosen. In the Navy this could be evident when the 
cost of the DDG-51 continues to decrease, and the Navy decides to 
purchase more. 
5. Evidence 
Identify the available evidence provides insight into why the Navy’s long-range 
shipbuilding plan was value-maximizing. 
D. WHY THIS PLAN AND WHY NOW? 
On July 1, 2014, Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Mr. Robert O. 
Work, submitted identical letters to the chairmen, chairwomen and ranking members of 
the various congressional defense committees. The page and a half memo succinctly 
outlined the purpose of the attached document, the FY2015 annual long-range plan for 
the construction of naval vessels. In one of the closing paragraphs, Mr. Work explains 
that he will “continue to work closely with the Navy regarding the sizing assumptions for 
our fleet.” This manner of addressing the Navy as an individual gives credence to the idea 
of the Navy as a rational actor. In addition to identifying the Navy as an individual, the 
cover letter outlines the requirements that the Navy must meet when submitting its plan. 
 21 
As all of the armed services do, the admirals and ranking civilians inside the Navy 
take their instructions from the president on the advice of the Secretary of Defense and 
the rest of the National Security Council. In the case of the Navy, the SECNAV also has 
a hand in shaping policy. The direction by which the current President, Barack Obama, 
chose to guide the DOD is evident in the 2012 strategic guidance; Sustaining U.S. Global 
Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Panetta, 2012). This high level guidance 
is only eight pages long and does not delve into the specific requirements of each 
individual service. In place of hard numbers, the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance 
outlines the primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces (Panetta, 2012). 
• Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare 
• Deter and Defeat Aggression 
• Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges 
• Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction 
• Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space 
• Maintain a Safe, Secure and Effective Nuclear Deterrent 
• Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities 
• Provide a Stabilizing Presence 
• Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations 
• Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief and Other Operations 
Each one of these missions has a paragraph in the DSG explaining the basic 
concepts and expanding just what the President has in mind when he calls upon these 
missions to be conducted. As a rational actor it is assumed that the Navy strove to meet 
all or as many as possible of these requirements when developing its 2015 annual long-
range shipbuilding plan because the Navy should be seeking to achieve its objectives. 
The 2015 long-range shipbuilding plan also had the added benefit of being 
released shortly after the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. The QDR provides broad 
stroke ideas similar to the DSG but delves into more specifics for each individual service. 
Thus, the Navy was provided with more detailed guidance. The following are specifically 
mentioned in the QDR: (Department of Defense, 2014) 
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• Maintaining a submarine based leg for strategic deterrent (SSBN(X)) 
• Sustaining or enhancing offensive capability with: 
• Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare weapons 
• Next-Generation Land Attack Weapon 
• Virginia Payload Module 
• F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
• The Advent of Flight III DDG-51 destroyers 
• Limiting the Littoral Combat ship to 32 vessels 
• Recapitalizing the aging Amphibious fleet 
• Making a decision on the future of the USS George Washington 
In a similar fashion to the 2012 DSG, as a rational actor the Navy would attempt 
to fulfil as many, if not all of the requirements laid out in the 2014 QDR because these 
too define objectives or constraints the actor must work within or else suffer the 
consequences.  
The DSG and the QDR are not without inputs from the Navy. In 2012, the Navy 
conducted a Force Structure Assessment (FSA) to evaluate how many ships it required to 
fulfil its mission sets. The previous assessment had occurred in 2005 and had settled at a 
target number of 313 ships. Yet due to several actions (including the DSG) the target 
number of vessels was reduced to 306. The Navy cited the following reasons: (OPNAV 
N8, 2013) 
• Operational Plans were re-examined 
• Shipbuilding programs were changed 
• Ship employment cycles were modified 
• Global posture forward was increased 
It is also essential to emphasize that the method of counting ships has varied over 
time. The current long-range shipbuilding plan uses the counting method set forth in 
SECNAVINST 5030.8B issued in March of 2014 replacing the 5030.8A instruction from 
2011. These rules were designed to better serve the Global Force Management Allocation 
Plan (GFMAP) and were received with some controversy (Secretary of the Navy, 2014) 
(Freedberg, 2014d). Oddly enough the adjustment to the counting rules did not change 
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the ultimate target goal of 306 ships, yet the makeup of that force has changed slightly. 
Table 1 depicts the targeted goals after the FSA using the older ship counting method 
while Figure 3 depicts the changes in battle force numbers over the life of the FY2015 
Long Range Plan using both counting methods. These exhibits provide a look into what a 
unitary actor would focus upon; numbers provide a starting point and a concrete target. A 
change in counting methodology also brings the Navy that much closer to its target goal 
of 306 vessels. 
Table 1.   Naval Combatant Force Structure (from OPNAV N8, 2013) 
Ship Type 2010 2012 
CVN 11 11 
Large Surface Combatant 94 88 
Small Combatant 55 52 
MCM 0 0 
LCS 55 52 
SSN 48 48 
SSGN 4 0 
SSBN 12 12 
Amphibious Ships 33 33 
LHA/LHD 11 11 
LPD 11 11 
LSD/LX( R) 11 11 
Combat Logistics Forces 30 29 
T-AO/AOE Oiler 19 17 
T-AKE Supply Ship 11 12 
JHSV 10 10 
Command and Support 16 23 
LCC Command Ship 2 2 
AS Tender 2 2 
ARS/AFT Salvage 8 8 
T-AGOS Surveillance 4 5 
T-AKE/MLP/AFSB 0 6 
 Total Battle Force Ships 313 306 
Numbers utilize SECNAVINST 5030.8A Counting Rules 
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Figure 3.  Projected Force Levels Resulting from FY2015 30-Year Shipbuilding 
Plan (from O’Rourke, 2014b) 
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E. THE RAM DECISION 
Acting as a rational actor, the Navy should endeavor to follow the guidance of the 
DSG and the QDR and therefore the makeup of its fleet would be expected to change to 
address changing goals in 2012, 2013 and 2014. The rational actor states that “As long as 
the Navy is able to procure the ships reflected in the plan, we will have a battle force that 
meets QDR requirement, and that will adequately sustain the national shipbuilding and 
naval combat systems design industrial bases” (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
[Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8)], 2014).  This quote provides evidence 
that the RAM holds. In this case the Navy has provided a document which can fulfill 
their governing requirements so long as the fiscal support is there. This is a value-
maximizing decision. And if they propose a shipbuilding plan that meets Navy needs, but 
are not in accordance with the DSG or QDR, the Navy will suffer consequences from the 
Secretary of Defense or Congress for failing to comply with the guidance 
Presented in Table 2 and Figure 4 is the Navy’s long-range projected battle force 
inventory under the current ship counting instruction. The Navy first attains its 306 ship 
goal in FY19 and then maintains above that mark for most of the next 30 years, falling 
below only five times. The last two years of the projection are trending downward but 
beyond FY2044 the makeup and more importantly the requirements of the U.S. Navy 
will most likely have changed substantially. The FY2015 Long Range Plan does address 
some of the impending costs of the high production years but this topic will be discussed 
later. Beyond the write-up of the document itself, much of the explanation of the decision 
is accomplished through various charts, graphs and appendices. Each one of these 
exhibits provides more credibility to the rational actor approach. Options can be clearly 
explored with manipulation of the numbers and consequences can be evaluated.  
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 Table 2.   Navy’s FY2015 Projected Battle Force Inventory 
 
 
Fiscal Year 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44
Aircraft Carrier 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 12 12 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 10
Large Surface Combatant 85 88 90 91 93 95 96 97 98 98 98 97 99 100 98 95 91 89 88 86 87 88 90 91 92 90 89 87 84 83
Small Surface Combatant 26 30 34 38 40 37 33 36 39 40 43 46 49 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Attack Submarines 54 53 50 52 51 49 49 48 49 48 47 45 44 41 41 41 43 43 45 46 48 49 51 50 51 51 51 52 52 52
Cruise Missile Submarines 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 1
Ballistic Missile Submarines 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 13 13 12 11 11 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 11 12 12 12
Amphibious Warfare Ships 30 31 32 33 33 33 33 33 33 34 34 36 35 36 35 35 34 34 35 34 32 32 33 33 33 32 33 32 31 31
Combat Logistics Force 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
Support Vessels 32 30 32 32 34 36 35 35 36 36 37 37 37 37 37 37 36 37 37 37 37 35 34 35 34 34 34 34 34 34
Total Naval Force Inventory 284 290 296 304 309 308 304 307 314 315 317 317 318 319 315 311 307 305 307 305 306 306 310 311 312 308 309 308 304 303
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Figure 4.  Total Battle Force Ship Numbers 
While Figure 4 depicts the overall ship numbers, Figure 5 presents information 
extrapolated from the current long-range projected inventory numbers broken down by 
the type of vessel. By assessing how the fleet will look at a nuanced level, the 
consequences of one option can be better compared to the consequences of another. This 
figure also provides a view of where the Navy has determined it must hold the line. The 
number of combat logistics ships is projected to be flat for the entire 30 year plan. This 
evidence shows the value that the Navy places upon that class of vessel and that 29 ships 
is the most value maximizing choice likely because that is what is required to support the 
deployed fleet. Any additional ships would provide excess capacity and take away 
funding from other classes of ships. At the same time, the demise of the dedicated cruise 
missile submarine demonstrates that the Navy no longer values that asset. The niche 
capability provided by those submarines can be delivered elsewhere in the plan. 
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 Figure 5.  Projected Vessel Count by Ship Type 
F. WERE THERE ALTERNATIVES: WHY DID THE NAVY SETTLE ON 
THESE SHIP NUMBERS IN THESE YEARS? 
The Navy had many alternatives in selecting the future battle force makeup. On 
the extreme ends, the Navy could have chosen to cease building aircraft carriers and just 
concentrate more on smaller, less expensive ships. It is also possible that the Navy could 
have decided to divest itself of the third leg of the nuclear triad, ballistic missile 
submarines. Of course, these choices would not be in line with any of the governing 
documents and policies by which the Navy is supposed to operate. A choice on the 
extreme would likewise have extreme consequences. In the end, the numbers chosen 
were very specific and conformed to the primary idea of the Rational Actor: value 
maximization (Allison & Zelikow, 1999).  These numbers address the Navy’s need to 
confront a variety of missions involving sub, surface, amphibious, air, nuclear and 
humanitarian capabilities. Because these ships often deploy in groups, this mixture has 
historically been considered the most valuable.  
I have already outlined several documents that played a major role in the 
substance of the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2015. 
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The broadest document is the Defense Strategic Guidance which is refined by the 2014 
Quadrennial Defense Review. The QDR’s focus on specific numbers ensures that at least 
part of the Navy’s eventual plan is pre-determined. In addition, there are laws on the 
books that guide the Navy’s structure. In Title 10 of the U.S. Code, chapter 507, section 
5062 mandates that “The naval combat forces of the Navy shall include not less than 11 
operational aircraft carriers” (Long-range plan for construction of naval vessels, 2010). 
However, the retirement of the USS Enterprise before her replacement was ready caused 
the number to drop to 10 carriers. The Navy was able to obtain permission from Congress 
for the temporary drop (Cavasa, 2014). The carrier issue is therefore something that the 
Navy chose to address directly in the long-range plan. Currently, the ex-Kitty Hawk will 
be maintained in an “out-of-commission, in-reserve status” until FY2016 at which point 
the Navy will accept the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) (Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations [Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8)], 2014).  Decisions such as 
these are another example of the RAM at work. The Navy was presented with a host of 
options and chose to address the situation in the plan they viewed as the most value 
maximizing way possible.   
The most pressing issue the Navy had to contend with in developing the FY2015 
Long Range Plan was the development of the Ohio replacement SSBN, ballistic missile 
submarine. The requirement of a suitable replacement is the first topic addressed in the 
2014 QDR and “12 fleet ballistic missile submarines” are the first ships listed in the 
target of 306 vessels. The Ohio replacement is also the first cost issue directly addressed 
in the long-range construction plan. This cost issue highlights one of the flaws of the 
Navy’s plan but also highlights what the Navy sees as its priorities. In this instance, the 
Navy understands the weakness of its plan and tactfully addresses Congress on its 
concerns. Subtly stated in the third section of the plan, the Navy summarizes what it sees 
as the ultimate goals it must achieve: 
This report outlines the Long-Range Naval Vessel Construction Plan 
necessary to build and maintain the battle force inventory outlined above 
and describes the resources necessary to implement this plan. As long as 
the Navy is able to procure the ships reflected in the plan we will have a 
battle force that meets QDR requirements and that will adequately 
sustain the national shipbuilding and naval combat systems design 
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industrial bases [emphasis added]. (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
[Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8)], 2014) 
The mention of the industrial bases is a nod to an additional legal requirement 
found in Chapter 9, Section 231, Title 10 of USC. Obviously it is extremely important to 
protect a robust industrial base for continued support of the U.S. Navy, but the main issue 
is still that of the almighty dollar. The following section of the plan begins to outline, in 
billions of dollars, just what the proposed plan would cost. Overall the Navy foresees 
costs increases of $4B over its historic annual average of $13B for ship procurement. The 
Navy points out that even if the Ohio replacement requirement was removed, “the 
average funding requirement beginning in FY2020 is ~$14-$15B/yr to build the FSA 
force” (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations [Integration of Capabilities and Resources 
(N8)], 2014).  The Navy understands the cost situation with the procurement of the Ohio 
replacement and makes sure to justify its FY2015 Long Range Plan as supporting the 
2012 FSA. Even if the Congress did not mandate that the Navy consider the industrial 
base, it is in the Navy’s interests to do so. Sustaining shipyard capability is value 
maximizing as it would be far less costly than reconstructing a lost shipyard. 
If money were not an issue, then the annual requirement to produce a plan would 
merely be a formality and would not be met with such scrutiny. The greatest challenge 
the Navy has to overcome when producing the long-range plan is clearly the budget. 
Therefore, the Navy submits a plan that meets all requirements (at least initially) but 
ultimately leaves success up to the purse strings controlled by Congress. A course of 
action such as this implies that the Navy is working according to the RAM. There is logic 
and reason behind a plan that may in fact be unachievable. The Navy viewed the options 
available and decided upon this route in order to maximize the return in a tight fiscal 
environment. But the arrival of these fiscal limitations did not appear to the Navy 
overnight.   
Arguably, the Navy showed its current cards early in 2014 when it was still 
formulating the FY2014 budget. But this trend was not new. Even in 2012, during the 
formulation of the FY2013 Long-Range shipbuilding plan, the Navy expressed concern 
that it would be under serious funding stress (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
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(Integration of Capabilities and Resources) (N8), 2012). There were several statements 
from inside the Pentagon about a move to “trade away size for high-end capability” and 
most speculated this was centered on reducing the number of serving aircraft carriers 
(Cavas, 2014a). In April of 2014 the Navy announced it would pull the budget request for 
the overhaul and refueling of the USS George Washington to “better align with budget 
planning” (LaGrone, 2014b). This was due in part to the new fiscal environment the 
DOD found itself working in, but also as a check against the impending sequestration and 
the Budget Control Act. Ultimately, the Navy moved to put the refueling back into its 
budget request and punted the ultimate fate of the George Washington to its FY2016 
budget request (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations [Integration of Capabilities and 
Resources (N8)], 2014). 
The decision to put an aircraft carrier on the chopping block was a conscious one 
by the Navy. Because the Navy knows it must build the new SSBN but cannot afford to 
construct everything else at the same time, the George Washington was offered up as a 
cost saving device. As a rational actor, the Navy chose the option that had the most value 
for the organization. Yet because an aircraft carrier is one of the most vaunted symbols of 
American power, this option gave Congress, the White House, and the American public a 
choice they could not stomach. This decision also begins to show a political side to the 
Navy’s actions that will be addressed in the government politics chapter.  
This budgetary decision highlights one of the major weaknesses in the Navy’s 
long-range shipbuilding plan: funding the totality of the new SSBN. A complex issue that 
pits one class of ship against another for funding priorities again highlights the decision 
making process of a rational actor. There are certain requirements that need to be met and 
certain collections of ships that can meet those requirements. In this example, the Navy 
weighed the options and chose the option that put the Ohio replacement ahead of the 
George Washington, a move the Navy saw as value maximizing. Unfortunately for the 
Navy, this is not the only fiscal obstruction they will have to negotiate.   
The Long-range plan correctly assesses that in the near term, the Navy will be 
able to meet all requirements that have been set forth. However, when the new submarine 
will be coming online, the costs will become far more than historic levels. Traditionally, 
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the financing of Navy shipbuilding efforts has averaged $13B a year in FY2014 constant 
dollars. In FY2020, due to the new SSBN, the funding would need to be increased to an 
average $17.2B per year until FY44 to execute the plan the Navy has outlined (Deputy 
Chief of Naval Operations [Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8)], 2014). 
During the peak SSBN procurement years (FY25-FY43) the average cost would be 
$19.7B. A breakdown in new vessel’s arrival by fiscal year is presented in Table 3 while 
funding requirements by type of vessel is presented in Figure 6. These figures again 
highlight the process of weighing options, determining consequences and choosing the 
value maximizing action. Even though the costs of the new SSBN are rather large 
compared to the other procurement programs, the Navy sees the Ohio replacement as a 
requirement of the highest priority. Therefore, as a rational actor, the Navy is willing to 
sacrifice the procurement of other vessels to ensure the replacement SSBN’s success.   
   




Table 3.   Long-Range Naval Battle Force Construction Plan 
Fiscal Year 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44
Aircraft Carrier 1 1 1 1 1 1
Large Surface Combatant 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2
Small Surface Combatant 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2
Attack Submarines 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Ballistic Missile Submarines 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Amphibious Warfare Ships 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2
Combat Logistics Force 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Support Vessels 3 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2
Total New Construction 7 8 11 10 8 11 8 11 11 13 8 7 5 10 7 10 8 12 9 9 5 5 7 10 8 11 8 10 9 8
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The Navy continues to addresses the impending future budget risk but with very 
little substance. The Navy simply states that it is “…committed to sustaining the 
appropriate readiness in today’s Navy while building a future fleet to meet the continuum 
of threats we will face through the bulk of this century and will do so to the extent our 
resources will permit”  (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations [Integration of Capabilities 
and Resources (N8)], 2014).  As a rational decision it may be a calculated risk in order to 
avoid any hard commitments and leave room to maneuver when the time comes. 
The Navy also mentions that, should the Budget Control Act (BCA) caps take 
effect in FY2016, the service will be unable to meet requirements set forth in the Future 
Years Defense Plans and that it will be necessary to revise these plans. There is limited 
guidance other than a needed “revision” and some analysts believe the Navy should never 
have planned to the pre-BCA levels (LaGrone, 2014c). While conservative planning 
would have probably given the Navy a more realistic view of the actual money it was 
going to have available, the service would have been unable to meet its stated goals with 
that funding. In the end, regardless of the impending budget crisis, the Navy concludes, 
“The strategic and operation risk to national security associated with the presented force 
structure of naval vessels is acceptable” (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations [Integration 
of Capabilities and Resources (N8)], 2014).  The Constitution gives the Congress the 
power to “provide and maintain a Navy” and the 30 year plan is only the Navy’s 
recommendation to Congress on how they will support their requirements, not a fully 
developed work plan. As such, the Navy may be rational in recommending more ships 
than it thinks it will be able to afford today because Congress always has the option to 
provide more money tomorrow. They might know from experience that the only way to 
get the additional funds is if they ask for them or show a level of fiscal stress in the plan. 
Though outside limits such as the BCA and the current fiscal environment are 
clearly affecting the FY2015 Long-range plan, the Navy is not without blame. In the mid-
2000s, the Navy continued to let the pace of ship acquisition be outpaced by ship 
retirement (O'Hanlon, 2009). It was not until 2009 when the Navy finally corrected a 
problem that had been occurring since the late ‘80s.  
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Figure 7.  Battle Force Ship Count from 1979–2012 
Though not as massive a problem as the fiscal environment, the constraints placed 
on the troubled LCS program have also given the Navy some planning difficulties. When 
the FY2013 Long-Rang shipbuilding plan was released in May of 2012, the LCS was 
designed to make up 55 of an “about 300” ship Navy (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
(Integration of Capabilities and Resources) (N8), 2012).  It is important to emphasize that 
the DSG had already been published and the FY2013 plan was in compliance with those 
requirements. The following year, the FY2014 guidance had reduced that planned 
number of LCS to 52 ships but now focused on the target number of a 306 ship Navy 
from the 2012 Navy FSA (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Integration of Capabilities 
and Resources)(N8), 2013). The loss of three LCS ships is never sufficiently addressed 
partly because the “around 300 ships” mentioned in the FY2013 plan actually addresses 
requirements for 310–16 ships. In situations like this, where a lack of explanation seems 
odd, the RAM falters in its ability to fully explain what the Navy is doing.   
Because the long range plan must be rehashed annually, there is some expected 
change to occur in the ships to be produced. With the change of counting rules, the 
makeup of the future fleet is even more pronounced. The change in battle force ship 






























































































Table 4.   Change in Total Battle Force Inventory from FY14-FY15 Long Range Plans 
Fiscal Year 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43
Aircraft Carrier xx 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Large Surface Combatant xx 7 6 7 7 7 8 8 10 11 9 10 8 8 10 10 9 9 8 7 6 5 4 4 3 2 0 -1 -1 -4
Small Surface Combatant xx 3 3 5 5 2 0 -4 -3 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Attack Submarines xx -1 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 1 0 0 -1 -1 -2 -1 -2 -1 -2 -1 -1 0 -1 0 0 1 1 2 1 1
Cruise Missile Submarines xx 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ballistic Missile Submarines xx 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amphibious Warfare Ships xx 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Combat Logistics Force xx 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Support Vessels xx 3 -1 -1 -1 -1 3 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Total Naval Force Inventory xx 14 10 13 13 9 13 8 10 17 13 14 15 14 17 16 14 13 11 11 8 7 3 4 4 4 2 2 1 -2
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The change from the FY2014 plan to the FY2015 plan is rather interesting. At this 
point, the requirement in the QDR has been laid out and the Navy is now limited to only 
32 littoral combat ships: a loss of 20 potential ships. Yet the information presented in 
Table 4 shows no such negative impact; rather, there is a marked increase in fleet size. 
This can all be attributed to the new ship counting rules found in SECNAVINST 
5030.8B. 
A reading of SECNAV 5030.8B with an understanding of the Annual Long-
Range shipbuilding plans immediately brings up areas of disagreement. The nine separate 
categories of ships listed in the FY2015 Long-Range Annual shipbuilding plan are not 
the same as the categories listed in the SECNAVINST and therefor some interpolation is 
required to balance what the Navy plans to build and what the Navy will count. The 
Naval Vessel Register (NVR) holds the current ship count and has similar categories 
towards its governing instruction, 5030.8B. The current count from the NVR is seen in 
Figure 8 while the variations in categories can be seen in Table 5. 
 
Figure 8.  Screen Capture of the Current Battle Force Inventory (from Naval Sea 
Systems Command, 2014) 
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Table 5.   Comparison of Categories between FY2015 Long Range Plan and 
the Naval Vessel Register 
 
 
While some of the categories clearly align (e.g. Aircraft Carriers), there is no 
specific breakdown of Large Surface Combatant and Small Surface Combatant in the 
NVR. The only breakdown the NVR provides can be seen partially in Figure 9. Upon 
delving into the Long-Range plans, the only Small Surface Combatants mentioned 
directly are the Littoral Combat Ship and the Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile 
frigate (FFG). The FY2015 plan also contains the following: 
Of note, the revised Counting rules reflect the addition of ships employed 
today to meet small surface combatant (SSC) requirements for which the 
Navy currently has insufficient SSC forces. While the bulk of the vessels 
we have added are forward deployed today, most will retire or will no 
longer be forward deployed by 2020 and therefore will have almost no 
impact on the enduring FSA ship count. (Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations [Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8)], 2014) 
This is extremely interesting in that the Navy has added the Costal Patrol Ships 
(PC) and its Mine Countermeasure Ships (MCM) to the SSC ship count for FY2014 and 
beyond. While the Navy admits it is exploring additional options for the SSC 
requirement, the QDR in no way implied that the Navy’s warfighting requirements were 
less with the reduction of the number of LCS’s. To look at this in another way, in 
FY2015 Long Range Plan 
Catagories
Naval Vessel Register 
Catagories
Aircraft Carrier Aircraft Carriers
Large Surface Combatant Surface Combatants
Small Surface Combatant Submarines
Attack Submarines Amphibious Warfare Ships
Ball istic Missile Submarines Mine Warfare Ships
Amphibious Warfare Ships Combat Logistics Ships
Combat Logistics Force Fleet Support
Support Vessels Auxiliary Support
Combatant Craft
Naval Reserve Force Active Ships
Other
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FY2014, the Navy needed 306 ships to do its mission. This number includes 52 LCS but 
not the PC’s and MCM’s that were already deployed and doing their job. In FY2015 the 
Navy still needs 306, but now this number includes the reduced number LCS and now 
counts the PC’s and MCM’s. If the SECNAVINST had existed in time for the FY2014 
plan, the Navy would have been planning for nearly 70 SSC’s when it stated that it only 
needed 52. So why would the Navy do this? 
 
Figure 9.  NVR Breakdown of Surface Combatants as of 29 September 2014 (from 
Naval Sea Systems Command, 2014) 
A possible explanation lies in the follow-on small surface combatant (SSC) the 
Navy is currently researching (Cavas, 2014b).  The FY2015 Long Range Plan admits that 
the PC craft being counted in the SSC category is only a temporary measure and should 
have “almost no impact on the enduring FSA ship count” by 2020 (Deputy Chief of 
Naval Operations [Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8)], 2014).  It is possible 
that the Navy sees this as enough time to research and produce the LCS replacement. 
Fitting with the paradigm of the rational actor, the Navy would choose a path of 
changing ship counts only if it thought it was value maximizing (Allison & Zelikow, 
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1999). It is possible that realizing the immense fiscal wall they were forced up against, 
they chose this route to look more in control of their situation. There was some 
condemnation on the change in metrics, but that seems to have died off after a month. If 
the Navy announced that it was facing an even larger budget shortfall due to imposed 
requirements stemming from the failure (perceived or not) of one of its current 
shipbuilding projects, it is possible that the potential backlash would have been greater 
and therefore less desirable. Again, the Navy chose a value-maximizing decision. 
However, this example may also serve to highlight the limitations of a strictly RAM 
approach. Perhaps there are other explanations for these discrepancies beyond the 
boundary of a rational actor which will be discussed in later chapters. 
There are two more elements to the FY2015 Long Range Plan that are worth 
investigating from a RAM standpoint: the future of the guided missile cruisers and 
amphibious vessel construction. As the oldest and largest of the large surface combatants 
the Navy identified a potential cost saving measure by moving 11 cruisers out of service 
into a period of prolonged modernization (Majumdar, 2014).  These vessels would return 
one at a time as in-service cruisers were decommissioned thus limiting the shortfall in 
large surface combatants during the 2030’s  (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
(Integration of Capabilities and Resources)(N8), 2013).  Though this move was 
ultimately rejected by Congress, the decision process was sound and a good 
representation of the RAM at work. The Navy viewed this option as value maximizing 
because it kept the ships available in case they were truly needed but reduced overall 
operating costs. 
Similarly, the construction of amphibious vessels also faces a fiscal challenge. 
The Senate directed the Navy to include an appendix outlining the future of such vessels 
when they submitted their FY2015 Budget. A similar appendix is provided in the FY2015 
Long Range plan and outlines a rational approach taken to the amphibious shortfall. As 
the agreed number of amphibious vessels for support of a 2.0 Marine Expeditionary 
Brigade lift is 38, but the Navy currently operates only 31 of these vessels. The shortfall 
must be explained somehow. The Navy again cites fiscal constraints as the reason they 
will not reach 38 vessels but instead plans on reaching and maintaining 33 amphibious 
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vessels. The Navy clearly states that with 33 vessels they maintain a level of “acceptable 
risk” (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Integration of Capabilities and Resources)(N8), 
2013). To better bolster their choice there is discussion of utilizing mobile landing 
platforms, afloat staging bases, and joint high speed vessels to move the Marines should 
the requirement arise. All of this is an example of weighing options, the valuation of 
consequences and the value maximizing choice being selected. 
G. SUMMARY OF THE RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL 
Ultimately, the rational actor model proves useful in analyzing the 30 year 
shipbuilding plan. As a “big picture” approach, the RAM is often the best place to begin 
when first analyzing a decision. In the case of the FY2015 Long Range Plan, the RAM 
outline works well with the Navy. The Navy can easily represent a unified actor 
addressing a problem with the ultimate outcome being a decision on that problem. In this 
case, the problem was the production of the annual 30-year shipbuilding plan while being 
aware of current constraints and requirements. The Navy set about in a logical process 
identifying its objectives, various options as well as potential consequences. Throughout 
the development of the plan the service remained true to the dominant inference pattern 
and made its decisions by selecting the value maximizing action.   
For the FY2015 Long Range Plan, the Navy outlined the fact that it could not get 
everything it wanted and was therefore willing to sacrifice some procurement to achieve 
what it saw as the most important. Other predetermined constraints that were imposed 
(e.g., the QDR’s reduction in the total number of LCS’s authorized) tied the Navy’s 
hands and removed some choice. For priorities, the Ohio replacement took top billing 
over even the future of aircraft carriers in the current plan. Consequences were outlined 
with the discussion of the fiscal environment. Tradeoffs were conducted when proposing 
the cruiser layup to mitigate cost and drops in ship numbers. Additionally, though the 
Navy would like to see 38 amphibious vessels, it has chosen to operate with a target 
number of 33 vessels; the money is needed elsewhere for shipboard procurement. The 
ultimate choice was one of value maximization for the Navy. 
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Yet the RAM lens can also present a simplified view of a problem and can leave 
some areas uncovered. The change in ship counting rules to reach the 306 target and the 
refueling of the George Washington underscored areas where the RAM may fall short in 
its explanation of a decision. The Navy is not a monolithic organization and there are 
many outside stakeholders who want a say on how many ships to build and what the 
future makeup of the fleet should look like. Government politics also come into play with 
bargaining going back and forth between many different parties. Understanding these 
other views through an organizational behavior or government politics model can fill in 
some gaps and better increase the understanding of the Annual Long-Range Plan for 
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V. APPLICATION OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 
MODEL 
The shift toward the organizational behavior (OB) decision model requires that 
we redefine the lens through which we have been examining the Annual Long-Range 
Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2015. While the Navy is often viewed a 
single organization when acting on the international stage, this approach will break the 
Navy into smaller internal organizations as well as highlight the influences of external 
organizations on decision making. The following is provided as an outline derived from 
Essence of Decision (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). 
A. EXPLANATION OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR MODEL 
While the rational actor model works well in its simplicity to explain the actions 
of a government or other actor, it is obvious to an outside observer that a government is 
far from a single actor and is composed of many individual parts or organizations. When 
making decisions on a governmental level, few if any decisions fall exclusively to the 
domain of one organization (Allison & Zelikow, 1999).  Because of this, government 
decisions can be viewed as the collective workings of several organizations. Even when 
the President may want to present a decision as his alone, he is influenced by the 
information and capabilities provided to him by individual organizations. Therefore, to 
discount the impact organizations can have on government decisions can result in a lack 
of understanding of what was really happening. 
Another tenet of governmental decisions and organizational interaction has to do 
with the complexity of the decision: the more complex, the more organizations involved 
(Allison & Zelikow, 1999).  These complex decisions are also undertaken within certain 
rules of organizational coordination and internal organization operations. Inside the 
government of the United States, agencies such as the DOD and Department of State 
have rehearsed routines for interaction. Inside individual units of the DOD, functioning 
rules are often codified into a set of standard operating procedures. These routines are 
essential in the day-to-day operation of an organization and often determine how they 
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will respond when stressed. Over time their actions can come to define the purpose of an 
organization. Allison and Zelikow argue that organizational behavior is “explained in 
terms of organizational purposes and practices common to the members of the 
organization, not those peculiar to one or another individual”  (Allison & Zelikow, 1999 
p. 144). 
 
B. OUTLINE FOR ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR MODEL 
To properly apply the organizational behavioral model characteristics to different 
actors in and around the Navy it is necessary to define certain characteristics of an 
organizational output. Similar to the structure of the rational actor chapter, the outline 
below has been molded from Essence of Decision and applied to the Navy (Allison & 
Zelikow, 1999). 
1. Basic Unit of Analysis: Navy Action as Organizational Output 
The OB Model views the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval 
Vessels for FY2015 as the product of an organization process “in three critical senses” 
(Allison & Zelikow, 1999).  First, the current plan was produced by an organization as a 
process of organizational output. In this case, the document came from the N8 office in 
the Pentagon—Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capability and 
Resources. Second, the existing organizations define the range of choice options. For 
example, the available shipyards and their capabilities define the maximum number of 
ships the Navy can produce. An organization such the Marines has firm ideas about the 
number of amphibious ships the Navy needs. And third, “organizational outputs structure 
the situation within the narrow constraints of which leaders must make their decisions” 
(Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 164).  For example, the Congress defines the requirements 
of the Navy therein ensuring a narrow possible outcome. “…the formal choice of leaders 
is frequently anticlimactic” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999 p.165). 
In finalizing the decision that was the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction 
of Naval Vessels for FY2015 it is important to realize that all information provided to the 
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decision makers, including capabilities, requirements, and options came from intra-
organizational outputs. 
2. Organizing Concepts 
a. Organizational Actors 
The actors at play inside the Navy include its major communities: Surface, 
Aviation, and Submarine (Wilson, 2000).  In addition, the Navy could also be organized 
from a planner, builder, and end-user standpoint. The planner would be the Deputy Chief 
of Naval Operations for Integration of Capability and Resources (N8) and the office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations, Surface Warfare Division (ONPAV N96), the builder 
would be NAVSEA, and the end-user would be Commander Fleet Forces Command 
(CFFC). Outside of the Navy, major players include the United States Marine Corps and 
the shipbuilding industry. 
b. Factored Problems and Fractionated Power 
Each previously identified organization has its own power base and set of 
requirements and capabilities. For example, Naval Aviation is headed by a flag officer 
who is referred to as the Air Boss. Only naval aviators are selected to command aircraft 
carriers whose numbers are mandated by federal laws. Naval Aviation and its mission are 
also supported by affiliated organizations representing the various aircraft communities in 
the Navy, such as the Tailhook Association and the Naval Helicopter Association. 
However, aircraft carriers are built by NAVSEA, a command dominated by the surface 
warfare community. The aviation community is responsible for the ship’s missions and 
operations while the surface community is responsible for their construction.   
c. Organizational Missions 
Inside the Navy, each community or office has its own mission and goals. While 
often derived from the governing documents discussed in the Rational Actor chapter, 
each organization defines how they support the mission differently. Outside of the Navy, 
each organization has its charter or purpose that guide how it operates. It is also important 
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to emphasize that “Organizations interpret mandates into their own terms” (Allison & 
Zelikow, 1999). 
d. Operational Objectives, Special Capacities, and Culture 
Because of the nature organizations and the way they often operate, the 
objectives, special capacities, and culture exhibit relatively stable conditions over time. 
For example, Naval Aviation has been a proponent of the power of the aircraft carrier 
since before World War II. In a similar fashion, the Marines pride themselves on their 
amphibious prowess and mark that as a key component that makes them unique from the 
U.S. Army. 
e. Action resulting in Organizational Output 
The concept of action that results in organizational output is the key to 
understanding the OB model. Allison and Zelikow argue that an organization’s action is 
“programed character” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 168). The way an organization 
behaves and contends with a problem is governed by a set of pre-established routines. 
The output produced by the activity of an organization is characterized by the following: 
(1) Objectives: Compliance Defining Acceptable Performance 
Inside the DOD the services strive to avoid, “(1) a decrease in dollars budgeted, 
(2) a decrease in manpower, (3) a decrease in the number of key specialists, (4) reduction 
in the percentage of the military budget allocated to that service, (5) encroachment of 
other services on that service’s roles and missions, and (6) inferiority to an enemy 
weapon of any class.” These standards translate well to the individual communities inside 
the Navy (Allison & Zelikow, 1999 p. 169). 
(2) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), Programs and Repertoires 
SOP’s are defined plans by which certain organizations take action or which 
guide an action. The more grounded in the overall structure of an organization, the more 
resistant they are to change. Each organization has developed ways of operating over 
time that do not necessarily welcome or adapt well to change. 
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Similar to SOP’s, programs and repertoires are evident in the routines by which 
an organization conducts extremely complex actions. For example, passing a bill in 
Congress has a defined routine which involves the interaction and coordination of 
thousands of individuals. Similarly, naval aviation has supported combatant commander 
requirements with 11 aircraft carriers for some time and will fight to maintain that 
number. 
(3) Uncertainty Avoidance 
When possible, organizations will avoid uncertainty. The more risky an action 
appears to an organization, the more likely they will avoid such a path. For example, 
individual organizations would not likely give power over their budgetary matters to 
another organization if they could avoid it.   
(4) Problem-directed Search 
If a situation is not covered by an organizations SOP’s or is foreign to their 
programs repertoires, the organization will search for alternatives and options. This is 
especially relevant in the tight fiscal environment the Navy finds itself in today. Each 
organization that is a major player in the long range plan has moved to develop new 
tactics to counter potential problems such as budgetary constraints. Often this has led to 
the development of external organizations such as the respective shipbuilding coalitions.  
(5) Organizational Learning and Change 
Organizations persist in status quo due to routines and culture. While they are 
generally capable of adapting to minor change or non-standard routines, certain 
conditions often prompt dramatic change. These conditions could include but are not 
limited to: (Allison & Zelikow, 1999) 
• Budgetary Feast 
• Prolonged Budgetary Famine 
• Dramatic Performance Failures 
For the purposes of the FY2015 Long Range Plan, the idea of a budgetary feast is 
now far-fetched with the end of major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the 
idea of an impending budgetary famine is very real. In addition, the perceived failure of 
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the LCS and the rising cost of the DDG-1000 Zumwalt class have caused many in the 
surface warfare community to question their acquisition priorities. 
(6) Decisions of Government Leaders 
Organizations have an inherent momentum but are still subject to imposed 
changes upon the orders of senior government leaders. As much as the USMC may want 
to see 10 new amphibious vessels commissioned, that will not happen unless senior 
government officials make it an absolute priority.  
3. Dominant Inference Pattern 
To understand what an organization will do when presented with a problem, it is 
best to look at what they have done in the most recent past. According to Essence of 
Decision; “The best explanation of an organization’s behavior at t is t-1; the best 
prediction of what will happen at t+1 is t” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999).  Back to the 
Marines, though they may want to see more amphibious vessels in their future, they have 
survived for quite some time with lower numbers and therefore will most likely continue 
at the same numbers. 
4. General Propositions 
a. Existing Organized Capabilities Influence Government Choice 
In this instance, because the Navy possesses certain capabilities, it is more likely 
that decision makers will choose to preserve those capabilities.   If the entire process of 
producing the FY2015 Long Range Plan is a result of organizational output, the move to 
preserve existing capabilities shows in the result. Again the Marines serve as an example. 
The amphibious capability is not viewed as the priority currently, but the capability is a 
requirement that will not be done away with.   
b. Organizational Priorities Shape Organization Implementation 
In the instance in which an organization has conflicting orders, or objectives, they 
will internally prioritize and understand the tradeoff of their actions. If the surface 
community realizes that they cannot have as many DDG-1000 vessels as they originally 
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planned, they will move to something they can accept – e.g., the production of more 
DDG-51’s. 
c. Leaders Neglect Calculations of Administrative Feasibility at their Peril 
When organizations are forced to operate outside their established routines, they 
are often less effective and can fail to accurately predict outcomes. Across the 
communities there are examples of failures and cost overruns when an organization has 
pushed the technology barrier with a new ship class or failed to account for long term 
maintenance costs of a new platform. The LCS, DDG-1000, SSN-21, LPD-17 and CVN-
78 all serve as examples. Leadership neglected the perceived costs and as a result the 
programs were truncated or cut outright.   
d. Limited Flexibility and Incremental Change 
Typical change in an organization is accomplished only incrementally. This is 
often a result of the following: (Allison & Zelikow, 1999) 
• Organizational Budgets change incrementally 
• Organizational culture priorities and perceptions are relatively stable 
• Organizational Procedures and repertoires change incrementally 
• New activities typically consist of marginal adaptations of existing 
programs and activities 
• A program once undertaken is not dropped at the point where objective 
costs outweigh benefits 
In the case of Navy shipbuilding, once a program has begun there is often only 
incremental change. Major change tends to occurs around the dawn of a new ship class 
normally from the identification of a new requirement. 
e. Long Range Planning 
Due to the inherent stability of the cultural aspects of organizations and the 
limited incremental change tendency, long range planning is often given only cursory 
attention. If it is a requirement, it could be performed and subsequently disregarded. 
Evidence of this exists in the FY2015 Long Range Plan. The majority of the document is 
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focused on the first 20 years of the plan with the final 10 years of the plan receiving only 
two paragraphs worth of discussion.   
f. Imperialism 
Organizations seek to grow and thrive in areas of budget, personnel, and 
autonomy. This concept is fairly obvious in more robust fiscal times but can be more 
subtle in an austere environment. Because the desire to expand organizational influence 
does not recede with funding, organizations may choose to fight for control of existing 
programs rather than develop new ones if budgets are tight.   
g. Directed Change 
It is possible for a directed change to have an impact on an organization. 
However, because many leaders that could affect such a change are elected into that 
position, organizations can often wait out an official. Therefore, this type of change does 
occur but is not that common. A recent example successful example of directed change 
for the surface community is the QDR imposed limit on the number of LCS vessels the 
Navy can construct. As long as that directive holds, the Navy will abide by it.   
5. Evidence 
While often more difficult to grasp, the OB model can provide a complementary 
view on the evidence at hand. By examining the organizations actually involved in the 
development process for a decision, individual organizational traits and priorities become 
evident. This OB model analysis can provide insights beyond those identified by the 
RAM in understanding the decisions made in developing the Annual Long-Range Plan 
for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2015 
C. BIG PICTURE VIEW OF THE NAVY AS AN ORGANIZATION 
Most often when the Navy itself is being discussed, it embodies the ideas 
discussed in the outline above and can be viewed as an organization. In the case of 
Essence of Decision, the Navy was viewed as an organization. Therefore, it is helpful to 
first take this view before breaking the Navy into smaller organizations and looking at the 
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outside organizational influences. While this has similarities to the rational actor 
approach, the lens of analysis is changed to the OB outline previously discussed. 
Because organizations are creatures of habit and routine, it is not surprising that 
there is often high similarity in the annual long-range shipbuilding plans of different 
years. For example, looking at the FY13 and FY14 plans (which share 29 planning 
years), most of the years varied in ship numbers by one ship or less. Only two years of 
the 29 showed a change of more than three ships between the two plans. This is evidence 
of incremental change as well as the limited alteration to the long-range planning in 
organizations and works to support the “Dominant Inference Pattern.”  The Navy kept 
with its strategy and had very incremental change for those years. However, we know 
that from FY14–FY15 there was a far more dramatic swing in the number of ships the 
Navy was projecting. While this seemly rebuffs the idea of incremental change, another 
aspect of the OB model can provide insight and explanation into this shift in projected 
ship numbers. 
Looking back at Table 4, the changes between the FY14 and FY15 plans, it is 
apparent that only four of the shared 29 years had projected battle force ship counts 
within three ships or less. Over half of the years showed a change of ten or greater ships. 
While much of this can be traced to the updated ship counting method, there is a deeper 
origin. The cause of this is an outcome of the organizational dynamic, “budgetary 
famine.” While the Navy has seen the bow wave of requirements vs. funding coming for 
some time, it was not until it became imminent that they were willing to directly address 
it in the FY2015 Long Range Plan. As seen in Table 5, the budget for shipbuilding has 
been generally increasing since the late ‘90s. After reaching a peak in FY11 leadership 
both in the White House and Congress have indicated a need to rein in the DOD budget. 
For the Navy, this represents a dynamic shift and a budgetary famine. The only bright 
side for the Navy is that the DOD budget tends to be cyclical and it is only a matter of 
time before it trends upwards. 
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 Table 6.   SCN Budget Trend from FY98 to FY15 (from Department of the 
Navy, 2014) 
Historically, the Navy has taken a rosy view of costs and funding when 
submitting its 30 year shipbuilding plan. The organizational characteristics that resist 
change have kept the Navy thinking that the budgetary feast of the past decade would 
continue. Yet as the budgets continued to shrink, the cost of the SSBN replacement kept 
creeping up and the Navy was forced to remove planning for a future flight of its Arleigh 
Burke class destroyers, it became clearer to the Navy as a whole that the shipbuilding 
plan was “unsustainable” (Freedberg, 2014c; LaGrone, 2014a). This also serves as an 
example of leaders neglecting administrative calculations at their own peril. Budgets for 
the military have always drawn down post conflict and there was nothing in the 
withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan to make the Navy think otherwise. Thus, the Navy 
as an organization is adapting to a dramatic change in the way it plans for the future and 

















*FY15 is a Budget Estimate 
Shipbuilding Conversion Navy (SCN) 
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Constant FY 2015 Dollars 
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D. INTERNAL NAVY ORGANIZATIONS 
Just as the services of the DOD often spar with each other for budgetary 
resources, so the communities internal to the Navy push for more funding. While it is not 
earth shattering to hear that an organization wants to continue to exist and seeks to 
influence others, looking at concrete examples provides further validity to the OB model. 
The initial analysis below looks inside the Navy to examine the different communities. In 
the case of N8 and N9 the Navy recently reorganized the headquarters staff from a 
functional alignment to a product alignment, further reinforcing the resource allocation 
power of these communities. Following that is a brief discussion of different commands 
that span communities and the budgeting process in general. Paramount in the discussion 
of the FY2015 Long-range plan is the debate of submarines. Specifically the plan 
addresses the need (and cost) of the SSBN Ohio replacement and the current production 
of the Virginia class attack submarine.  
1. Submarines 
The United States Navy submarine community is often referred to as the “Silent 
Service,” but in its attempts to further itself as an organization, it has been far from silent. 
Looking into one of the premier Naval Warfare magazines, Proceedings, it is not hard to 
find an instance of the submarine service pushing the submarine service’s agenda. In a 
simple, one-page article, two authors argue that the SSBN program can help “guarantee 
our very existence, deterring potential enemies from using weapons with unimaginable 
consequences” (Bruner & Cockey, 2014). While the article focused on nuclear 
deterrence, there was no mention of the other two legs of the nuclear triad; long range 
nuclear capable bombers and shore based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—
both operated by the U.S. Air Force. Looking further into Proceedings, it was not 
difficult to find another submarine article in which the other legs were mentioned. This 
article mentioned the flexibility of the other two legs but concluded that the submarine 
was the “ultimate backstop and guarantor of deterrence” and thus is the anchor of the 
nuclear triad (Hoeft, 2013). These presentations are both interesting as they focus on a 
medium primarily targeted at the other sea services and their components. This example 
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of organizational imperialism shows how the submarine community views itself in the 
strategic defense of the United States as more important than the other legs of the triad 
and therefore rightly deserving of additional funding.   
When the Submarine community looks inward, the tone is only slightly different. 
Following with the OB ideas that surround the culture of an organization, it is safe to say 
that most members of the silent service already value the nuclear deterrence they provide 
and would probably rank it as superior to the other legs. Inside their organizational 
magazines the submarine community endeavors to educate their members on areas 
beyond the stated tactical purposes of submarines. There are several instances of 
reporting on the Virginia program as a “model of excellence” (Tofalo, 2014). Interviews 
with the Program Manager of the Virginia class line of ships gives further pride in the 
organization by explaining just how and why they are getting a new submarine. 
Described as the “most technologically advanced and operationally effective submarines 
in the world” there is really no bad news presented to the reader (Goggins, 2014). The 
mention of long delays is passed off as “growing pains that all new classes of ships face.” 
In place of any talk of cost overruns are numbers like “$5.4 billion” and “16% in 
savings” (Wynn, 2011). Any trepidation a submariner would have held about the future 
of their organizational programs is quickly dismissed by their organization’s own 
publication. Thus, the organizational culture and values are reinforced and the 
organization continues to believe in its existence. These ideas are further examples of 
imperialism and operational objectives from the OB model. 
Though these documents prove interesting, they do not directly influence 
anything with the FY2015 Long-range plan. Instead, their influence is indirect. When 
members of the Navy brass read Proceedings or discuss the future of submarines with a 
submariner, they can begin to see the value that a submarine brings to the fight. Yet some 
of the more overt influence that the submarine community exerts on decision makers 
comes from the Naval Submarine League. A not-for-profit, the League’s self-stated 
mission is “…to PROMOTE AWARENESS [emphasis added] of the importance of 
submarines to U.S. national security” (Naval Submarine League, 2014).  It should also be 
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noted that the Naval Submarine League has 60 corporate members who most assuredly 
want to promote a continuing submarine production line.  
The Naval Submarine League hosts a “JHU/APL (John Hopkins 
University/Applied Physics Lab) Submarine Technology Symposium” and a “Corporate 
Benefactor Days” convention that invite some key players responsible for shaping the 
future force. The Benefactor convention hosts top leaders in the Submarine community 
including the Commander, Submarine Forces, Director, Undersea Warfare, OPNAV, and 
Program Executive Officer, Submarines. More importantly, in attendance at the 2014 
convention were two members of the Congress. As funding spans party lines, there was a 
Democrat, the Honorable Richard Blumenthal and a Republican, the Honorable Rob 
Wittman. At that time they both served on their respective Senate or House Armed 
Service Committee, and represented Connecticut and Virginia, respectively, each a home 
to submarine bases. The Submarine League knows where to seed its ideas. Also attending 
the symposium was an advisor to Congress; the Honorable Ronald O’Rourke gave the 
luncheon address. As an expert in Naval Affairs for the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS), he was quick to point out that his views were his alone and not those of Congress 
or the CRS. In his speech he stated “Over the last year or so, I have been interested to 
observe that an awareness of the value of the Submarine Force in generating this 
asymmetric advantage appears to be growing among policy makers” (O’Rourke, 2014a).  
As stated in the OB outline, the first four objectives of organizations inside the DOD are 
to avoid the following: “(1) a decrease in dollars budgeted, (2) a decrease in manpower, 
(3) a decrease in the number of key specialists, (4) reduction in the percentage of the 
military budget allocated to that service” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 169). By focusing 
on the people who make those decisions and a potential influencer of those decisions, the 
submarine community effectively exhibits the characteristics of a DOD organization. 
All of this influence no doubt aided the submarine agenda in the push to build 
more even in a tight fiscal environment. But there is another organizational factor at play 
for “Big Navy.” Organizations with defined capabilities do not want to lose that 
capability and therefore will fight to preserve it. All of this combined to produce a 
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FY2015 plan that required a set number of submarines even though the plan itself said it 
was unsustainable.  
2. Naval Aviation 
Naval Aviation is very similar to the Submarine Community but has a much 
sharper focus on the type of ships it wishes to procure: Aircraft Carriers. While it is true 
that Navy helicopters embark on most cruisers, frigates, Flight IIA destroyers and now 
the Littoral Combat Ship, Naval Aviation as a community does not have to expend 
energy keeping those types of ships in production; they are lobbied for and operated by 
the Surface Navy. And while NAVSEA oversees the construction of such surface 
combatants NAVAIR must work with them to ensure their airworthiness for helicopters. 
At the same time NAVAIR and NAVSEA must work together to design and build aircraft 
carriers. This example of fractionated power illustrates how two organizations with 
different focuses must work together to design and build aircraft carriers and air capable 
ships. Meanwhile, the organizational efforts of Naval Aviators mirror almost exactly the 
structure discussed in the submarine community and generally focuses on the 
construction and national importance of the aircraft carrier. 
For example, Naval Aviation has several professional organizations dedicated to 
promoting and educating the force including The Association of Naval Aviation, the 
Naval Helicopter Association, and the Tailhook Association. Each one of these smaller 
organizations has internal magazines and webpages that exude the values, history and 
capabilities of Naval Aviation. In “The Hook,” a quarterly magazine from the Tailhook 
Association, Commander, Naval Air Forces said “The fiscal challenges and extraordinary 
dynamics back inside the beltway continue and are likely to for some time. But at the 
same time, we’re seeing the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group turned around after mission 
completion and ordered to remain on station” (Buss, 2013). It is clear that Naval Aviation 
understands the environment they operate in but also wants to ensure that their members 
understand the value they bring to the Navy and the nation as a whole. Of course this was 
directed internally at the organization. As we start to look outside, we can see how the 
organization fights to maintain its culture and ensure its mission continues.  
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An article posted in Proceedings highlights just how important understanding 
Naval Aviation and its current state is to utilizing its full capabilities. “Understanding the 
purpose behind a course of action motivates and inspires an organization’s members, 
aligning the efforts required to bring a project to life” (Sinek, 2011). The article 
highlights how a wave of new multi-mission platforms will bring enhanced capabilities 
and interoperability and that “Nothing embodies the flexibility of naval aviation, the 
strategic impact of forward presence and the inherent benefits of modularity like a 
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier” (Snodgrass, 2013). Having defined the amazing things 
that Naval Aviation can do, the conclusion of the article is that it is essential to move 
towards a new aircraft carrier. Oddly enough, the quote from Sinek, though referencing 
naval aviation, could be utilized by any organization to further its purpose.  
In January of 2014, as the budget realities of keeping 11 carriers operational and 
having to refuel the USS George Washington began to become unaffordable, Naval 
Aviation circled its wagons and began to push back against anyone who would withhold 
funding (Cavas, 2014a). Turning towards the naval audience, once again in Proceedings, 
the Director of Air Warfare on the Chief of Naval Operation’s staff argued that the 
question was not how to afford to build them (carriers), but “How can we not afford to 
build them [emphasis added]” (Manazir, 2014)? In the following months, as the budget 
noose tightened, Naval Aviation argued that despite some cost increases, the overall leap 
in capability will greatly outweigh the cost (Manvel & Perin, 2014). 
As the Naval Aviation effort began to pick up steam, other members of the Navy 
began to realize just what lay in store for the entire team if one carrier were to be 
removed. Speaking at the Western Conference and Exposition (WEST 2014), the 
commander of U.S. Fleet Forces remarked that a carrier cut would increase the 
operational tempo for sailors on other carriers (LaGrone, 2014d). Around the same time, 
the U.S. Pacific Commander echoed the need for 11 carriers (Grady, 2014). All of this 
talk, not to mention what was being discussed at the capital shows the effort in one 
organization championing its cause. In the end, the funding was made available and 
Naval Aviation will keep its 11 carrier force, at least for the time being.   Organizational 
priorities in Naval Aviation are obvious: aircraft carriers. Organizational imperialism is 
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evident in the fight mustered in support of an 11 carrier Navy. The loss of a capability 
such as an aircraft carrier would be unacceptable to an organization built on established 
routines and capabilities.   
3. Surface Navy 
The idea of the Surface Navy as an organization could be foreign to many people 
not familiar with the internal organization of the Navy. Indeed, many people see the Navy 
as only ships and so use the term Navy interchangeably with the Surface Fleet. For the 
purpose of this paper, the Surface Navy can be best viewed by looking at the internal 
publications, articles in Proceedings and the actions of the Surface Navy Association 
(SNA). Similar in purpose to the previous community’s professional organizations, the 
SNA’s first stated purpose is “To promote recognition of the role of the Navy and 
Surface Forces in United States’ security” (Surface Navy Association, 2014). 
The winter 2013 issue of Surface Warfare contained a summary of where the 
Surface Navy sees itself from the view of its leadership. In a section called “Cardinal 
Headings,” the Admirals laid out the purpose of the surface fleet as well as the challenges 
associated with the current fiscal environment. The theme throughout harkens on the 
value a ship can provide through its life, the flexibility surface ships provide, and the 
occasional need to spend a larger price to achieve the right capability. “…this may lead to 
additional costs at the time of purchase, but the value over an expected service life must 
be weighed more heavily than the initial “sticker” price” (Commander, Naval Surface 
Forces, 2013). This could be a subtle explanation of the curtailment of the LCS and 
possible follow on of the small surface combatant. However, on the same topic of price, 
the Zumwalt class destroyer has become so expensive without a massive gain in 
capability that it will be limited to three vessels. In that case the initial sticker price could 
not even justify the value provided. As organizational imperialism would drive an 
organization to continue to procure additional vessels, the realities of budgetary famine 
can restrain what an organization can accomplish. 
Knowing what an organization values internally allows an assessment of the 
opinions it puts forwards and actions it takes on its behalf. As the Surface Navy begins to 
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spread its message to its fellow naval forces, similar organizational patterns emerge. 
Articles championing the Aegis fleet and the development of Ballistic Missile Defense 
abound. The story of a shoot down of a rogue U.S. satellite, named USA 193, paints the 
surface fleet as the only thing standing between a peaceful future and potential ecological 
ruin (Hicks & Grecco, 2014). The Director, Surface Warfare Division on the Chief of 
Naval Operations’ (CNO) staff takes time in another article to outline how the guidance 
of the President and the CNO are shaping the future of the Surface fleet (Rowden, 2014). 
Again the common themes of budgetary constraint and increased operational tempo are 
addressed. Yet the Surface Navy also acknowledges that these challenges will leave itself 
in a position where it will lack a surge capability in order to provide for its deployed fleet. 
Unlike the Aviation and Submarine community who roundly fought any future 
degradation, the Surface Navy concludes that this is inevitable. There is a cultural 
mindset visible in the Surface Navy in which the community accepts doing more with 
less. Deployment lengths are growing and down time is shrinking but the Surface Navy 
prides itself on its ability to push through.   
When the Surface Navy seeks to influence decision makers, it is very clear that 
they cast a wide net. The speaker invitation list from the SNA 2014 symposium includes 
U.S. Navy Admirals across the communities, a Senator, the Secretary of the Navy, as 
well as Admirals and Generals from the Coast Guard, Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force. 
These speakers were chosen for the expertise in their field, but also to show support for 
the surface community as a whole. As the speakers and members of the SNA walk 
around their 2014 convention, they are also inundated with over 60 vendor booths from 
industry. Themes of organizational priorities and imperialism are evident in the actions of 
the Surface Navy. All of this comes back to the FY2015 Long-range plan showing that 
the Surface Navy is playing the long game. Indeed, looking at the total ship numbers in 
the middle of the 30 year plan puts the Navy well over its 306 ship goal.  
E. INTERNAL COMMANDS AND PPBE 
The process of actually ordering and paying for ships is an extremely involved 
process which is far more in depth than the annual shipbuilding plan. It involves 
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commands across the Navy that plan, build, and utilize these vessels and offices that 
develop a budget that the Navy can submit to Congress to pay for these new warships. In 
its simplest form, the cycle of determining what you need, to paying for it, is called 
planning, programing, budgeting, and execution or PPBE. The main offices in preparing 
the document come from the OPNAV N8 and N9. While N8 actually releases the 
document and ensures that the proper procedures are followed, N9 holds great influence 
over the content of the plan. A simple way to view the relationship is that N9 determines 
what the Navy wants while N8 determines what the Navy can have. When addressing 
PPBE, the primary focus will be addressing action as a result of organizational output. 
1. PPBE 
The planning portion of PPBE is the first step of the process and sometimes the 
most abstract. It involves inputs from the CNO, the Combatant Commanders, and other 
high level officials to determine just what it is the Navy needs to do its job. The output is 
a defined capability requirement. This process is not a one-time occurrence and is 
constantly being reviewed. When able, planning attempts focus on individual fiscal years 
though the requirements may span decades (Schwartz, 2013). 
Following the completion of the planning requirement, staffs inside the Navy 
begin setting and building the proposed plans into actual programs. The specific 
capabilities defined in the planning portion are vetted within each service and down to 
individual programs. This is the most important part for planning for future vessels. 
Looking out five years, the programmers must balance the cost of programs in order to 
produce as much capability as possible. Each program establishes a program objective 
memorandum or POM that outlines exactly what the program will entail. Programs that 
are viewed as essential move on to the next phase (Schwartz, 2013). 
The budgeting phase of PPBE is the portion where actual monies are set aside for 
the various programs. This occurs simultaneously with the programing phase. Budgets 
tend to increase over the fiscal years for a new program as the size of a program increases 
(Schwartz, 2013). 
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The final phase, execution, is the actual implementation of the planning, 
programing, and budgeting phases as well as collecting data on how the programs are 
performing. For most programs there are established metrics by which they are measured 
and evaluated (Schwartz, 2013). 
Figure 10 displays a graphical representation of the ongoing PPBE process and 
highlights the various N8 offices involved in the process. While the shipbuilding plan 
normally accompanies the budget, but the budget process takes more than a year to 
complete, as one is being released, the next one is already being revised and constantly 
being refined. 
 
Figure 10.  PPBE Overview (from Bruner, 2014) 
2. What you Can Have vs. What you Want: N8 and N96 
In 2012 the CNO realigned his staff to better fulfil the needs of the Navy. While 
historically N8 had housed both the financial team and the future warfighting 
requirements planning team, the CNO moved N86, Director Surface Warfare, to a newly 
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created office, N96, Director of Surface Warfare. The Directors of Expeditionary 
Warfare, Undersea Warfare and Air Warfare were also set up in new offices, from N85, 
N87 and N88 to N95, N97, and N98, respectively. These new positions fell under a new 
three star position, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems (N9). The 
CNO’s purpose was to “enhance the Navy’s ability to navigate our fiscal challenges and 
deliver fleet and platform readiness while aligning responsibility and accountability to 
those who develop and sustain our Navy’s warfare capability” (Greenert J. W., 2012).  
N96 still views his job to “plan and program for current and future readiness, including 
maintenance, modernization, manpower, sensors, weapons, and training, so the surface 
ships operating around the world today have everything they need to complete their 
assigned missions” (Rowden, 2014).  However, to place this plan into action they must 
work together with the N8 offices to properly allocate resources.   
The realignment plays well into the outline of the OB model. While the staff had 
previously been organized in a functional alignment (manpower, operations, and 
acquisitions) the new organization is a product alignment (expeditionary, ships, 
submarines, and aircraft). Acceptable performance has changed accordingly. So has the 
way problems are defined. Because N8 and N9 now have set mission and requirements 
which do not fully align, there will be more of a challenge to any submission or request. 
In addition, the N8 office now enforced SOP’s and follows the guidance of government 
leadership, in this case the CNO, to ensure fiscal responsibility. N9 must now work its 
deep desire for more construction into the constraints imposed by N8.   
In a similar manner, N96 has taken its guidance from the President in the DSG 
and reestablished its priorities as follows: (Rowden, 2014) 
• Support rebalance to Pacific  
• Build to the future  
• Make the things we have today work 
Allison and Zelikow would view these leadership induced shifts as “triggering 
existing organizational routines in a new context”  (Allison & Zelikow, 1999 p.174).  The 
overaching mission has remained the same, but the focus has shifted from land warfare in 
the middle east to the open ocean of the Pacific. 
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3. NAVSEA and CFFC: Build it and Use it 
Once planning and funding have concluded, the task of building the fleet takes 
over. While much of the physical construction of United States Navy vessels is 
completed at various civilian shipyards around the country, it is NAVSEA that oversees 
the process from conception to commissioning. The NAVSEA stated mission is simple, 
“We design, build, deliver and maintain ships and systems on time and on cost for the 
U.S. Navy” (Naval Sea Systems Command, 2014 ).  NAVSEA works with the planners 
previously discussed to design a ship with a required capability and then utilizes the 
industrial base available to bring that new ship to fruition. The same concept applies to 
many new technologies or updates that will be placed on existing ships.   
Once these vessels are constructed, tested and commissioned, they pass to the 
user; in the case of ships this is CFFC. The first tenet of the Fleet Forces Mission 
statement is: “Train, certify and provide combat-ready Navy forces to Combatant 
Commanders that are capable of conducting prompt, sustained naval, joint, and combined 
operations in support of U.S. national interests” (U.S. Fleet Forces Command, 2014).  
This mission is impossible without the ships provided by NAVSEA and funded through 
the N8/N9 process. 
What is interesting about the N8/N9 and NAVSEA/CFFC process is the division 
of responsibilities amongst the organizations.   Such division could serve as a form of 
checks and balances to ensure that each organization stays in its respective lane and 
focuses all its energy on doing its job to the best of its own abilities. This prevention of 
central authority allows for “more specialized attention to particular facets of problems 
than would be possible if government leaders tried to cope with the problems by 
themselves” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999 p. 167).  A review of organizational websites 
show how NAVSEA and CFFC pride themselves on their work and emphasize how 
essential their jobs are to national security (Naval Sea Systems Command, 2014 ) (U.S. 
Fleet Forces Command, 2014). While CFFC may want as much money as possible in his 
Operations and Maintenance – Navy (O&MN) budget, he also recognizes that N9 needs 
to buy more ships for his operations. In a similar fashion, articles from the director of 
N96 express the same understanding and viewpoint (Rowden, 2014).  As identified by 
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Allison and Zelikow, each organization has now established its own identity, culture, and 
set of specific capabilities.   
The principles of OB can also be employed here to explain a discrepancy 
identified in the RAM chapter. The information in Table 5 displayed a discrepancy in the 
ship counting categories between the FY2015 Long Range Plan and the official count at 
the NVR. Though they both agreed on the same total number (290) it is odd that they 
would use different categories of ships to reach this number. The answer may lay in the 
organizational routines of the two parent organizations. N8 is responsible for the long 
range plan while NAVSEA is responsible for the NVR. Each organization has a set way 
of doing business that need not be reconciled with other offices in the Navy. Thus, there 
are two valid ways to distribute categories of ships and still reach 290. 
F. ORGANIZATIONS EXTERNAL TO THE NAVY 
 Moving outside the Navy there are several other organizations that have a stake 
in the annual 30 year shipbuilding plan. Each one has its own distinct interests and will 
fight for its cause and its representation in the long range shipbuilding plan. Sometimes 
these groups choose to stand alone while other times they work together with other 
organizations to support a joint cause. Throughout this section, the OB aspects of 
organizational missions, operational objectives, cultures and existing capabilities will be 
paramount. 
1. United States Marine Corps 
The closest organization to the Navy (and technically still inside the department 
of the Navy) is the United States Marine Corps, USMC. The idea of the amphibious 
Navy is nearly as old as the Navy itself. Traditionally in the US, the Marines have been 
the service employed in that amphibious role with the Navy providing transport. The 
Marines view this as one of their core competencies and are currently and have been 
fighting for a larger portion of the force for some time. Directly from the Marine’s 
website we can find a good internal perspective on the importance of the amphibious 
fleet. The “Amphibious Overview” provides a detailed outline of just what the combined 
Navy-Marine team can bring to the fight. Included in this document are three critically 
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important areas that align well with the current U.S. defense policy: (United States 
Marine Corps, 2014) 
• Forward presence to support engagement and theater security cooperation  
• A ready force to immediately respond to emergent crises  
• A credible and sustainable forcible-entry capability, operating from the 
sea, over the horizon, at night or during periods of reduced visibility 
Analyzing what the USMC as an organization want to accomplish relative to the 
30 year shipbuilding plan, we see that it continues to follow the outline of the OB model. 
In some articles the Marines contend that the current shipbuilding plan is out of balance 
and has built up the long range strike capabilities of the fleet at the expense of the 
amphibious side (Hammond, 2013). While admitting that all aspects of the fleet have 
declined since the height of the cold war, the author argues that the newfound capabilities 
of the fleet do not serve the national interest and that “amphibious flexibility is the 
greatest strategic asset that a sea-based power possesses.” 
A targeted article by a retired Marine Colonel and current Naval War College 
professor attacks the 30 year shipbuilding plan directly. Recognizing the unsustainable 
costs and the current trend of using the amphibious fleet as a relief valve when the Navy 
needs more shipbuilding money, the author charges both the Navy and Marine Corps 
leadership with pursuing more cost effective options to reach the target of 38 amphibious 
ships agreed upon in the early 2000s (Fuquea, 2014). This idea of shifting targets falls in 
line with the idea of a budgetary famine but has yet to achieve full acceptance throughout 
the Marines. 
Outside the pages of Proceedings, the Marine’s leadership is not shy about 
voicing their opinions. The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps expressed his 
views on the current state of the Amphibious Navy as representative of the Marines as an 
Organization. “We have a paucity of amphibious shipping and many of us in the Marine 
Corps are not happy with it, we are not happy as an institution” (Freedberg, 2014a). What 
is also important to emphasize is that to avoid offending the Navy and its decision 
makers, he allows some understanding for the current shipbuilding plan. “I love my Navy 
shipmates and they have an incredible challenge with capital investments, ok? They’ve 
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been working very hard and very well in a really resource-constrained environment” 
(Freedberg, 2014a). 
The Marines have recently teamed with industry to form an “Amphibious 
Warship Industrial Coalition” (Freedberg, 2014a). The purpose is clearly summarized by 
the director of expeditionary warfare on the Navy Staff, a Marine Major General, 
“Having a coalition base like this, I think… is probably very important, we [haven’t had] 
that to be able to get that message out there.” The Marines as an organization are working 
hard to continue their culture and have found this option as a possible strategy to a 
potentially devastating problem. 
2. Industry 
Whether to look at the shipbuilding industry as a whole or one single organization 
does present some challenges. Oftentimes companies within the industry actively 
compete against others and company secrets are carefully guarded. At the same time, 
consolidation in the defense industry has been common, and all companies are hoping the 
Defense Department and in this case, the Navy, will purchase more of whatever the 
industry is selling. In the case of the 30-year shipbuilding plan, industry wants the Navy 
to buy more ships. 
The idea that an industry wants a strong customer base is obvious. What is 
interesting is how the industry has completely inserted itself into so many parts of the 
military. Besides the previously mentioned Amphibious Warfare Industrial Base 
Coalition (AWIBC), there also exists a Submarine Industrial Base Council (SIBC) and an 
Aircraft Carrier Industrial Base Coalition (ACIBC). The following are the texts of their 
mission statements: 
AWIBC (AWIBC, 2014) 
AWIBC advocates for Congress to provide funding for the sustained and 
stable construction of amphibious warships vital to the mission of the U.S. 
Navy and U.S. Marine Corps. 
SIBC (SIBC, 2014) 
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The Submarine Industrial Base Council’s mission is to educate 
policymakers and the public on the need to preserve the strength of the 
U.S. submarine force and promote the value of the submarine industrial 
base as a vital part of our national security structure. 
ACIBC (ACIBC, 2014) 
The purpose of ACIBC is to communicate to members of Congress, the 
media and the general public the importance of sustained federal funding 
for the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier and maintenance program to preserve the 
strength of the aircraft carrier force and the aircraft carrier industrial base. 
Not surprisingly, the mission statements could be copies of each other if not for 
the specific mention of their group. Further review of these organizations shows just how 
broad of a base they claim to support. The AWIBC is new and does not yet list its 
members nor specify how many individual companies it lobbies on behalf of, but the 
SIBC and the ACIBC claim to lobby for 4,000 and 2,000 companies, respectively.   
Each one of these organizations was formed from a need to protect its core 
competencies. In the case of AWIBC, the shipbuilder Huntington Ingalls brought the 
fellow companies together for lobbying purposes (Freedberg, 2014a). The ultimate goal 
is to hopefully have the companies under the AWIBC umbrella all writing their 
congressmen and expressing concern with the current amphibious Navy. 
Because of the budgetary famine that the industry is now facing, there is a real 
sense that the industry is actually at its lowest possible point of being able to support 
national defense and the Navy has to keep the current builders employed. With only one 
shipyard that can build aircraft carriers (Newport News), two that build submarines 
(Newport News and Electric Boat), two that build large surface ships (Bath Iron Works 
and Ingalls), one that builds amphibious vessels (Ingalls) and one that builds auxiliaries 
(NASSCO) the Navy has acknowledged publicly that they do not want to harm the 
industrial base that they rely upon and are actively working with Congress to provide 
stability for some of the yards in-between naval ship construction (Stackley, 2013). 
Due to lack of specific lobbying information we are unable to further delve into 
the role of industry in the 30-year shipbuilding plan. It is clear that industry leaders and 
the established lobbying groups meet with Navy leaders at regular intervals. However, as 
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most communities in the Navy already want to increase their slice of the budgetary pie, 
these meetings are likely no more than an opportunity to ensure they are all sending the 
same message. The most important role that industry plays is its influence on Congress. 
Because the power of the purse resides in those elected officials, it is in industry’s best 
interest to keep them well funded in their reelection campaign and to constantly push 
their agenda. Similar to the objectives discussed for DOD organizations, the industry 
seems to hold to the first three: “(1) a decrease in dollars budgeted, (2) a decrease in 
manpower, and (3) a decrease in the number of key specialists. Organizational 
imperialism and capability are both evident in the lobbying methods of the shipbuilding 
industry. 
G. SUMMARY OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR MODEL 
As this chapter demonstrates, a more in-depth comprehension of a government 
decision can be attained through a better understanding of the organizations involved and 
how organizational behavior impacts that decision. The analysis identified the players 
involved with the FY2015 Long Range Plan and provided examples of routines and 
priorities that ultimately shape the document. The idea that power is not held by one 
individual and that fractionated power exists across the Navy is displayed in the internal 
struggle amongst many organizations affected by the FY2015 Long Range Plan. For 
example, N8 and N9 must work to resolve their competing mission priorities; thus, trade-
offs between cost and capability shape the document from its inception. As evident in the 
current plan, the future budgetary constraints are so formidable and the required 
capabilities so essential that a deal of sorts was reached. N9 is planning to build the Ohio 
replacement while N8 is advising Congress that this cannot be completed without 
additional funding.    
The concept of organizational change through budgetary famine was 
unmistakable in nearly every organization with a stake in the future fleet. Naval Aviation 
faced the threat of losing an aircraft carrier while the Marines are unable to force the 
Navy to procure more amphibious vessels. Costs and capabilities have forced the Surface 
Navy to prematurely end production of the Zumwalt class and LCS and develop new 
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plans for the future of the fleet. One of the plans favored by the surface navy is evidence 
of two other tenets of the OB model. By producing more Arleigh Burke class destroyers, 
they maintain their existing organizational capabilities and avoid uncertainty. 
In the civilian sector, like groups of shipbuilders have formed alliance 
organizations with the stated purpose of keeping themselves in business. Profitability is 
easily inferred from the mission statements of these alliance organizations which is a 
clear example of organizational imperialism. These groups lobby both the Navy and the 
Congress to ensure they grow and thrive. 
The OB model works well as a lens to examine the FY2015 Long Range Plan by 
showing the organizations behind the plan and the priorities that govern their actions. 
Because no one organization is all powerful, the ultimate outcome is based off of routines 
and procedures. The increasingly constrained fiscal environment can be seen as the 
dynamic event leading to the dynamic change evident in the FY2015 Long Range Plan. 
With the impending budgetary famine, organizations must re-evaluate priorities, and seek 
out new areas of influence to further their existence. 
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VI. APPLICATION OF THE GOVERNMENT POLITICS MODEL 
In the final model of Essence of Decision, Allison and Zelikow emphasize the 
values and positions of the major players in government as the driving force behind a 
government decision. Much of the behind the scenes view they provide is based on 
declassified government documents surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis (Allison & 
Zelikow, 1999). This access provided an unprecedented level of clarity into the political 
workings of the government and enabled the full effect and success of the Government 
Politics (GP) Model as a way to view complex government decisions. 
A. EXPLANATION OF THE GOVERNMENT POLITICS MODEL 
In the third and final model developed, the output will not be viewed as that of a 
rational actor, or organizational workings, but as the “result of bargaining games” 
(Allison & Zelikow, 1999 p. 255).  In the GP model, there are many players each with a 
host of issues. For example, while a sitting senator obviously has duty to his/her country, 
he/she balances that with the other duties to his/her party, his/her constituancy, and 
his/her reelection campaign fund. These sometimes conflicting interests force a leader to 
choose priorities and often bargain to support many goals. Yet the GP model is not 
restricted to elected political leaders. Captains of industry, military leaders, and experts in 
certain fields can and often do play a role in political gamesmanship. Many times these 
players represent larger organizations each with their own internal power struggle and 
key actors. Often times leaders at the top of a complex organization are pulled in so many 
directions that the end result or decision by a group may be far different that what was 
originally intended by the individual leaders  (Allison & Zelikow, 1999 p. 258). 
Unfortunately the inner workings of the much of the Navy, including that of the 
office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Integration of Capabilities and 
Resources) (N8) have not been released and such insight into the Annual Long-Range 
Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2015 is lacking. Nor is there much 
unclassified public information regarding the force requirement discussions of the 
President and combatant commanders. Alison and Zelikow note this is quite often the 
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case for the GP model: “Accurate accounts of the bargaining that yielded a resolution of 
the issue are rarer still.”  However, what is available is still valuable. The public 
statements by major players and the document itself allow for valuable inferences to be 
drawn. While viewing the FY2015 Long Range Plan from the Government Politics lens 
may be somewhat limited in scope, what documents, interviews, and committee meetings 
are available will be examined utilizing the following outline laid out in Essence of 
Decision: 
B. GOVERNMENT POLITICS OUTLINE 
Moving from an organizational behavior model to a government politics model is 
not a difficult step. Each organization is made up of individuals and at the top sits a 
president, CEO, commanding officer, etc. These individuals have a large say in where 
their organizations lean but are not all powerful. They are supported by groups of people 
below them each with their own ideas. Through compromise, bargaining, and 
positioning, decisions are made. Thus, “the name of the game is politics” (Allison & 
Zelikow, 1999 p. 255). 
1. Basic Unit of Analysis: Governmental Action as Political Resultant 
The Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2015 is 
the result of compromise, conflict, and possibly even confusion within the Navy due to 
specific political interests and unequal influence. In this sense the word ‘political’ means 
that the “activity from which decisions and actions emerge is best characterized as 
bargaining along regularized channels among individual members of the government” 
(Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 295). 
2. Organizing Concepts 
a. Who Plays? 
Players in Positions: The Navy is neither a unitary actor nor an amalgamation of 
different organizations; instead it is made up of individuals in various jobs. Different jobs 
come with different levels of power and responsibility that can shape an individual’s 
views. Communities and commands inside the Navy are led by individuals who must take 
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into account his/her own feelings and interests as well as those of his or her organization. 
Industry leaders face similar constraints. As previously mentioned, the elected political 
leaders face perhaps the most numerous constraints of them all. Outside actors such as 
the press or resident experts of certain fields could play a role as well anytime their 
participation is warranted or they force themselves into the bargaining act. The analysis 
presented in this thesis will focus on the actions of a few key players. 
b. What Factors Shape Players’ Perceptions, Preferences, and Stands on 
the Issue at Hand? 
Parochial Priorities and Perceptions: Just as organizations fought to maintain their 
own interests in the OB model, individuals at the heads of organizations tend to fight for 
their organization’s interests as well as their own. It is not unheard of for a member of the 
military to negotiate with a defense contractor for a job in their area of expertise upon 
their retirement (after any legal time off requirements.)  In a similar fashion, the heads of 
the community organizational bodies discussed in the OB chapter (SNA, Tailhook, Naval 
Helicopter Association etc.) are all active or retired military in those respective 
communities. 
Goals and Interests: Understanding how each individual views the goals of the 
National Defense Strategy, DSG and the QDR can influence how they play their hand. 
Ultimately these are still the documents around which action is centered. However, a 
hawkish politician may push for a more militaristic interpretation (therefore more 
funding) as opposed to someone who wants only diplomatic channels to drive national 
policy. 
Stakes and Stands: Overlapping interests and the impact a decision can have on an 
organization shape an individual’s stance. For example, more money for one program 
will almost assuredly remove money from another. The fiscal environment still remains 
tight and there are no actions without consequences. 
Deadlines and Faces of Issues: Deadlines and events force the players of the game 
to take a stand and defend their position. The Navy must present its long range plan every 
year to Congress. Similarly, the Navy must present and defend its budget request every 
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year. These deadlines often cluster the areas of interest in the long range plan. Of course, 
Congress does not have to pass a budget every year but they must at least attempt 
something. 
c. What Determines Each Player’s Impact on Results?  
Power in three forms determines each player’s impact: (Allison & Zelikow, 1999 
p. 300)   
• bargaining advantages  
• skill and will in using bargaining advantages 
• other players’ perceptions of the first two ingredients 
This is the true essence of politics. Shrewd negotiation or positional authority will 
get anyone only so far. No one person in the government has all of the power. Therefore, 
bargaining is often the only way to achieve your goals. Yet in a military organization, 
there are instances of some absolute power. For example, if N9 issues an order that they 
want something a certain way, then N96 will comply. On the other hand, N8 has no 
requirement to comply with an order from N9 and vice versa, but they do have to work 
together. N9 may have an advantage in saying he/she represents the needs of the fleet, but 
N8 has an advantage in having only so much funding available. Any agreement comes 
from negotiation. 
d. Action as Political Resultant: No One Person Will Determine the 
Outcome.  
Because no one player has all the power, each player will use their own power to 
influence others and bring other players to their side of the argument. Quite often the 
ultimate result is a compromise of some form. Political games inside the government 
generally have some form of rules, formal or not. In the military, a chain of command 
governs how you approach senior officers. While N96 may have to follow the orders of 
N9, he may also have a hand in shaping them. If N96 can convince N9 that his way of 
doing something may be the best, than N9 may make that a practice throughout his 
office. 
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At the same time, a player may take an action that seems contrary to his/her 
desires. The hope in this case is that others may respond in a way to give the player what 
they really want in the first place. For example, a subordinate may propose to remove an 
aircraft carrier from service due to budget cuts just so someone with the power of the 
purse may act to avoid such an outcome. 
3. Dominant Inference Pattern 
The Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2015 is 
the result of bargaining amongst individuals and groups inside and outside of the Navy. 
The GP Model allows for errors and mistakes that end up in the final decision.  
4. General Propositions 
(1) Action and Intention 
 The final Navy action does not presuppose Navy intention. For example, while 
N8 and N9 each have their priorities, when the two meet to formalize a decision, the 
ultimate outcome will be a compromise and not exactly what each one envisioned.   
(2) Where you stand depends on where you sit 
 Each player represents an organization that imposes a unique set of demands or 
desires. “Knowledge of the organizational seat at the table yields significant about a 
likely stand” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 307).  Sometimes this is obvious; NAVAIR 
will push for aircraft carriers. Sometimes this is not as obvious as one may think. If the 
head of N96 (Director, Naval Surface Warfare) spent his entire career in the amphibious 
side of the Navy, then that person may have a predisposition to favor more amphibious 
vessels.  
(3) Problems and Solutions 
 Each player will likely focus on the solution to their individual piece of a 
problem rather than the problem as a whole. If the problem is the Annual Long-Range 
Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2015 then it is likely the USMC will focus 
on the construction of amphibious vessels.   
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(4) Misexpectation, miscommunication, and reticence 
 The GP model allows for errors in the process to be carried through to the end 
result. Just as humans are flawed, their decisions can be flawed as well. A shipyard may 
project the cost of a new vessel at $X millions of dollars and though they were well 
intentioned, they may make some miscalculations and be well under the actual cost. This 
estimate, however, may move the Navy to plan to purchase additional vessels and 
therefore be stuck later when they do not have enough money to fund their long range 
plan. 
5. Evidence 
Unfortunately the evidence for the GP model is lacking as previously mentioned. 
Allison and Zelikow note this problem as well and state that “Much information must be 
gleaned from the participants themselves” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999 p. 312).  Because 
the author did not have access to interview insiders, or examine high level government 
strategy documents, the analysis is somewhat speculative and based on a small sample of 
actors and inferences from their actions and statements. 
C. THE CNO 
It is nearly impossible to discuss any current Navy policy without mentioning the 
head of the Navy. The current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, 
rose to become the leader of the Navy from the submarine community (United States 
Navy, 2014).  He commanded various units in the fleet and as served as the deputy chief 
of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8). As CNO he is 
arguably in a more influential position than anyone to chart the course of the Navy. He 
has both the ear of the President and the Congress and sets guidance of his own for the 
entire Navy to follow. Though there are no internal memos or recordings available to 
codify his true positions, he has testified before Congress and given many interviews that 
give some insight to his overall position. An examination of the testimony he gave on 12 
March, 2014 regarding the president’s FY2015 budget submission exemplifies the GP 
model. 
 78 
In the initial discussion of the FY2015 budget, the CNO immediately references 
the QDR and DSG as his guiding documents for planning. From those documents the 
CNO highlights the Navy’s guidance to “continue to build a future fleet that is able to 
deliver the required presence and capabilities and address the most important warfighting 
scenarios”  (Greenert J. , 2014).  Following this the Admiral reiterates the potential harm 
that can come from the Budget Control Act of 2011. Because the CNO holds better 
knowledge of the possible impact to the Navy the BCA would have, he does hold some 
bargaining advantage over congress. And because Congress has ultimate authority on the 
BCA, this is an excellent example of the need for communication amongst leaders and 
the possibility of negotiation. Indeed the following page of his testimony highlights tough 
choices the Navy was forced to make because of the current fiscal environment. Because 
some of these changes include reductions in spending in certain congressional districts, it 
is clear that the Admiral understands his audience and how to explain the Navy’s current 
situation in ways that might encourage other parties to support him in attaining additional 
resources. 
The Admiral takes an interesting approach when presenting how the fleet will 
look in 2020. He identifies a battle force of 308 ships in 2020 but there is only a footnote 
to address the change in ship counting guidelines. There is also a notable omission in the 
footnote; the problem of target end strength and revised counting rules is not addressed. 
This issue of changing ship counting rules but not changing the target number of ships 
was first addressed in the RAM chapter. It is expected that a rational actor would present 
his/her argument for a decision alongside all available information. Yet this is where the 
RAM is limited in explaining such omissions and the where the GP model becomes 
useful.  
Throughout the CNO’s entire testimony, there is never a reference to the 
previously established goal of 306 ships. The CNO’s goals and interest center around 
funding the Navy and procuring more ships. There is discussion on how thin the fleet is 
stretched and how hard is to find ships to fulfill missions. With current force levels, the 
Navy is only capable of meeting 44% of the Combatant Commanders requests. The only 
target number the CNO mentions is a fleet of 450 ships which would then meet 100% of 
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the requirements of the Combatant Commanders (Greenert J. , 2014).  While the actual 
reason the 306 target number is nowhere to be found is not clear, there is one theory. In 
the footnote explaining the new counting rules, the difference in ship levels in FY2020 is 
308 under the new rules and 302 under the old rules. See Figure 11 for the image from 
the actual document. If the Admiral had said the Navy’s target was 306 ships and then 
presented a plan in which the Navy reached 306 ships only by changing the counting 
procedures then he would be inviting serious scrutiny into his future plans. Alternatively, 
the CNO could have conducted an additional FSA to see if the target number had shifted 
under the new counting rules, but this too would have invited more inquiry.   As far as the 
GP model is concerned, this could have been a simple example of a miscommunication, 
error or reticence.   This presentation method could also be the CNO’s chosen method to 
address a specific problem. Without an interview with the CNO asking him this question 
directly the reason for the omission may never be clear. This is where the GP model 
excels by allowing for misexpectation, miscommunication, and reticence in a decision.   
 
Figure 11.  Highlighted changes from the adjustment of ship counting rules (from 
Greenert J., 2014)  
Looking into more specifics of the CNO’s testimony, we can see a common link 
of priorities with the FY2015 Long Range Plan. The Ohio replacement is described by 
the CNO as “our top priority program” and is initially highlighted in a section explaining 
the possible negatives of a lack of funding  (Greenert J. , 2014).  Later, the program is 
addressed in multiple sections as essential to the country and the number one of six 
programming priorities for the Navy. However, the portrayal of future funding challenges 
is not as dire as in the FY2015 Long Range Plan. The current plan outright says the 
funding level required is “unsustainable” and “cannot be accommodated by the Navy 
from existing resources…” (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations [Integration of 
Capabilities and Resources (N8)], 2014).  Rather than striking a dismal tone, the Admiral 
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admits increasing concern and states: “The Navy cannot procure the Ohio replacement in 
the 2020s within historical shipbuilding funding levels without severely impacting other 
Navy programs” (Greenert J. , 2014). This line of thinking is somewhat similar to the 
FY2014 Long Range Plan where funding the Ohio replacement without a funding 
increase will simply take away from construction of other ships in the battle force 
(Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Integration of Capabilities and Resources)(N8), 
2013).   While the CNO is the head of the Navy, he does not have a monopoly on 
everything the Navy produces. Another Admiral in the CNO’s staff, in this case N8 must 
constantly look at what the Navy can afford. In the GP model this is a prime example of 
where you sit influencing where you stand. The person with an eye on the budget 
presents an increasingly dire fiscal situation while the head of the Navy presents a 
challenge ahead, but nothing unsustainable.   
There is one more open source report that sheds a bit more light on the beliefs and 
decision power of the CNO. When the budget was squeezing Navy priorities in the early 
part of 2014, the CNO made the decision to cut the refueling of the USS George 
Washington to fit more shipbuilding in the Navy’s budget.  “That was CNO’s decision 
and it was based on recent reviews where CNO felt it was more accurate to capture the 
total cost across the FYDP rather than solely address FY2015” (LaGrone, 2014b).  This 
statement, coming from the CNO’s spokesman, adds credence to the power of the GP 
model by directly showing how one individual can impact the direction of an 
organization like the Navy.   
There is one more statement attributable to the CNO that exemplifies a 
government political dynamic. As discussed in the RAM chapter, the Navy has proposed 
a plan to place 11 guided missile cruisers out of service and into a state of prolonged 
modernization. While not ideal for the Navy, there may have been ulterior motives 
behind this proposal than that presented in the RAM chapter. The following is taken from 
a CRS report to Congress:  
It would not be a “bad thing” if Congress ultimately blocks the Navy from 
taking half its cruisers out of service next year as long as lawmakers 
follow a historical pattern of providing the funds to keep the ships 
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operating, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert said 
Wednesday [May 21]. 
Greenert told reporters the Navy’s 2015 budget proposal that includes 
sidelining 11 of the 22 cruisers for long-term modernization was not an 
ideal solution but instead driven by spending constraints. If Congress can 
pay to operate the ships, the Navy will keep active, he said. 
“It’s not a good idea to put into a modernization availability a ship before 
it really needs to go in and that is not something we wanted to do but felt 
we were compelled to do,” Greenert said at a breakfast hosted by the 
Defense Writers Group. “So if the decision is ‘no, I don’t want you do 
that, here’s the money, continue to operate those ships,’ that’s not a bad 
thing.” 
“We need ships,” he added.... 
“What would be optimal is that we continue to operate (the ships) and then 
when the time comes bring them in for modernization,” he said. “But I 
need operating money to do that, personnel money, and we don’t have that 
in the funds given to us.” (O’Rourke, 2014b) 
This statement highlights the value of looking beyond the RAM and focusing on 
the actions of major players. From where the CNO sits, he views his service’s monetary 
woes as a problem and has sought out a unique way to solve them. This is evidence of 
both ‘problems and solutions’ and ‘action as political resultant’. The CNO knew he could 
not fund the operations of the remaining cruisers, yet he is also aware that Congress does 
not want the Navy to retire any cruisers early. Using this information he found a solution 
to his problem by planning to lay up 11 cruisers anticipating that the Congress would 
balk at the proposal and provide funding for at least some of the ships. 
D. ASSISTANT COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS 
The next player in the Navy shipbuilding plan sits outside the Navy proper, but 
inside the Department of the Navy. As Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, 
General John Paxton was appointed by the President and represents issues that the 
Commandant views as important. Historically the role has involved budgetary decisions. 
But the biography of General Paxton presents someone whose particular seat at the table 
and career path has greatly influenced his opinion – a pillar of the GP model. With 
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service as Executive Assistant to the Undersecretary of the Navy and Amphibious 
Operations Officer/Crisis Action Team Executive Officer he became intimately familiar 
with the amphibious side of the Navy. Because acquisition is an important function of the 
office of the Secretary of the Navy, and the Undersecretary is a member of that office, 
General Paxton no doubt saw the priority level of amphibious vessels. To this end he has 
made great efforts to increase the number of the amphibious vessels in the Navy’s 
procurement plan. 
General Paxton said, “We have a paucity of amphibious shipping and many of us 
in the Marine Corps are not happy with it, we are not happy as an institution”  
(Freedberg, 2014b).  In addition, the general has explained how the lack of amphibious 
vessels has forced the Marines to develop new types of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces 
or MAGTFs.  “The reason we have special-purpose MAGTFs is because we don’t have 
enough amphibs. A challenge we will continue to have over the next decade is the 
resources/demand mismatch” (Burgess, 2014).  These last remarks were made to the 
Navy League, a group of individuals who see legislative advocacy as one of their most 
important missions (Navy League of the United States, 2014).  These views are also held 
by the current Commandant of the Marine Corps, the recently confirmed General 
Dunford, as well as 20 retired Marine generals who wrote an open letter to Congress  
(Munoz, 2014) (USNI News, 2014).  Here, parochial priorities have surfaced in order to 
further the group’s goals and interests. 
Yet it appears to be General Paxton who has been the Marines’ point man for this 
issue. Often citing that the CNO and Commandant have already agreed the Navy needs 
38 amphibious vessels, he often gives examples showing the versatility, capability and 
demand of these craft. Because action is a political resultant in the GP model, the 
Assistant Commandant can negotiate both with the Navy for more vessels and with the 
Congress. General Paxton has brought his amphibious vessel concern directly to 
Congress in his statements before the readiness subcommittee of the Senate armed 
services committee (Paxton, 2014). In his testimony it is evident that the amphibious 
vessels are his primary interest. Yet ever working in the political realm, General Paxton 
chooses not to browbeat his counterparts in the Navy but has worked to show he 
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understands the current fiscal environment.  “I would appreciate it if you quote this 
correctly, I love my Navy shipmates and they have an incredible challenge with capital 
investments, ok? They’ve been working very hard and very well in a really resource-
constrained environment” (Freedberg, 2014b).  These efforts to persuade the Navy yet 
lobby the people behind the checkbook, Congress, are a fantastic example of politics at 
play. If the closed door sessions were available it would undoubtedly be more telling.  
E. CONGRESSMAN RANDY FORBES 
Of course the discussion of the GP model would not be complete without a brief 
discussion of an elected politician. In this case the limitations still apply, since there are 
no closed door transcripts that give greater insight into the thinking of our congressional 
leadership.   
Congressman Randy Forbes, a Republican from Virginia’s 4th (Forbes, 2014a) 
district is an excellent example of how politicians play into the long range Navy 
shipbuilding plan. Congressman Forbes represents a district with tremendous ties to the 
Navy. With multiple Navy bases and shipyards in the region, he has taken an active role 
in developing the course of the Navy as the Chairman of the House Armed Services 
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces  (House Armed Services Committee, 
2014). 
The Congressman is not afraid to express his opinions. Seeing the writing on the 
wall for the cost of the Ohio class replacement back in 2013, he believes it should be 
completely removed from shipbuilding budget and put into the defense budget as a whole 
(LaGrone, 2013).  A move like this highlights the gamesmanship of the GP model and 
just how much where you stand depends on where you sit. There is no one way to solve a 
problem and though the CNO or Assistant Commandant may only see their small slice of 
the shipbuilding budget available for procuring ships, Congressman Forbes is willing to 
make the Ohio replacement entirely separate part of the budget. On the refueling of the 
George Washington, Congressman Forbes’ subcommittee issued a mark to fence off 50% 
of the Office of the Secretary of Defenses’ budget unless they obligated funds to plan for 
the refuel (Freedberg, 2014e).  Overall, his strategy of what the Navy should look like 
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was summed up in an article he co-wrote with John F. Lehman, the former Secretary of 
the Navy who proposed a 600 ship Navy (Lehman & Forbes, 2014). 
To begin with, our Navy must simply build more ships. The Navy says 
that 306 vessels is the minimum necessary to meet our national-security 
requirements. Outside experts, like the 2010 QDR National Defense Panel, 
put the number closer to 350 ships. While technology and maintenance 
techniques continue to improve, the demand for naval presence and the 
strain on military families and naval hulls from rapid deployments all 
place a limit on the classic mantra that the military can do “more with 
less.” A plan that reverses the downward spiral in ship construction is 
essential to stimulate a new naval renaissance. 
Congressman Forbes has acted within his power to make this happen. 
Unfortunately the budget of the Department of Defense is an often contested political 
document. To increase it, especially in a certain area such as shipbuilding is not without 
tradeoffs. Thus, the GP model again provides a solid framework to evaluate government 
decisions. Political tradeoffs occur and no one person determines the outcome. 
While it may seem that Congressman Forbes fights for the Navy in whatever 
manner available, he has also been one of its outspoken critics. He was one of the first to 
fault the Navy for changing the method by which it counted ships stating “I am 
disappointed to see the Navy is now counting ships like Patrol Craft and Hospital Ships 
in its battle force fleet that only a year ago it chose not to count” (Freedberg, 2014d).  The 
congressman has also faulted the Navy for not thinking strategically and as previously 
mentioned he was an outspoken member opposed to cutting a carrier (Forbes, 2014b). 
Though he wields a significant amount of power, he still cannot control every action of 
the Navy and must do what he can to influence those inside of the Navy. If the Navy 
perceives Congressman Forbes to hold significant bargaining advantages as well as skill 
and will in using those advantages, the sea service will most likely acquiesce to some of 
his demands. 
All of these actions and statements play well into defining Congressman Forbes as 
a player in the GP model. What is perhaps most interesting is that his view of the future 
Navy does not necessarily match up perfectly with the QDR or the DSG. Sitting where he 
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does in a military district, he has chosen to focus his efforts that affect not only himself, 
but his constituency. Where he stands clearly depends on where he sits. 
F. SUMMARY OF THE GOVERNMENT POLITICS MODEL 
As the organizational behavior model gave new insight into the FY2015 Long 
Range Plan, so the government politics model provides another perspective. People in 
high level positions in government, often in charge of a large organization, have 
significant influence in the outcomes of governmental decisions.   
The general proposition that where you stand depends on where you sit rings true 
throughout this chapter. The CNO is forced to deal with a declining shipbuilding budget 
but must somehow endeavor to build all manner of naval vessels. General Paxton has the 
ability to focus on amphibious vessels, while Congressman Forbes can criticize from 
outside the Navy and attempt to enact legislation to save whatever he feels is essential.   
The supposition that action is a political resultant also holds true. Even though the 
CNO is the head of the Navy, he needs his cruisers to sustain operational commitments. 
Realizing the only way to keep them may be a plan to put them out of service, the CNO 
moved forward with such a plan. By showing Congress such an unacceptable proposal 
and then working with Congress for funding, he was able to avoid laying up all 11 
vessels. Similarly, the discussion on refueling the George Washington required 
negotiation and gamesmanship. The CNO proposed the cancellation of the refueling 
betting that Congress would object to such a move. In both the cruiser and the carrier 
issue the bargaining advantage was on the side of the CNO. He showed the will to lay up 
many of his most capable assets and the Congress moved to make sure that this did not 
occur.   
And finally, the fact that the GP model allows for miscommunications, errors, and 
reticence provides a method for explaining the shift in counting vessels and the omission 
of a more detailed clarification in the CNO’s testimony before Congress. Of course if the 
omission was intentional, then the GP model also allows for such an action. In the GP 




A. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE THREE MODELS 
The Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2015 is 
not a document that is taken lightly. The legal requirements for its production and the 
supporting documents that guide its construction ultimately shape a plan for the future of 
the Navy. When it is released it is pored over both inside the government and by those 
outside with a stake in the matter. Often-times criticism comes swiftly and harshly 
questions how the Navy could arrive at such a decision; other times supporters of the plan 
work to ensure it is implemented.   
The analysis presented in this thesis reveals that this complex decision is 
ultimately arrived at through a multifaceted process involving many players and 
organizations, their interests and goals, organizational routines, rational analysis and 
political strategizing. Using the rational actor model, organizational behavior model, and 
government politics model, provides a more complete picture of the decision-making 
process behind the FY2015 Long Range Plan. Each lens adds further understanding of 
why and how the Navy arrived at this plan. 
The RAM provides understanding of the basic history, requirements, and goals of 
the annual shipbuilding plan. As a rational actor the Navy developed its requirements and 
compared them to its current and future capabilities. It took a value-maximizing approach 
to the allocation of increasingly scarce resource across the decades. Identifying the Ohio 
replacement as its top priority the Navy then moved to balance the immense cost of the 
Ohio program against its other identified requirements. Realizing that some trade-offs 
must occur, the Navy planned to mothball some of its cruiser fleet and potentially cancel 
the refueling of the USS George Washington. The Navy also changed its ship counting 
methodology. Because some of these actions do not appear completely rational, other 
decision-making models can help us understand them. The RAM tells us the decision is 
the net result of a value-maximizing rational analysis of costs and benefits. 
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The OB model provides additional insight into how this plan was developed. 
Evidence of organizational influence both from the internal structure of the Navy and the 
advocates surrounding the Navy displays how different organizations work to shape the 
final document based off of their own capabilities, cultures, and missions. The idea that 
power is not held by one individual and that fractionated power exists across the Navy is 
displayed in the internal struggle amongst many organizations. Often power is fractioned 
amongst several organizations who must blend their missions with established routines to 
reach a decision. For example, N8 must balance resources while N9 has the requirement; 
within N9 the submariners compete with the aviators who compete with the surface and 
expeditionary forces. The formal PPBE process establishes standard procedures for 
holding this competition for resources. Outside the Navy, different lobbying groups rally 
support for their cause and attempt to champion their ideas to the leaders in the Navy as 
well as in Congress. The OB model presents a world of fiefdoms where culture and 
routine control nearly everything. The OB model tells us the decision is the net result of 
all the several outputs of the different organizations involved and the routines they 
follow. 
And finally, the GP model allows an even more nuanced view of the power 
players involved with the FY2015 Long Range Plan. Individual players holding varying 
levels of power and influence, strategize and bargain to shape the future of the Navy. The 
CNO clearly has expert power and an informational bargaining advantage, but does not 
have ultimate control over what the future of the Navy will look like. His calculated 
decision to put the George Washington on the chopping block ultimately resulted in more 
funding for the Navy. While it might not have appeared rational under the RAM analysis, 
it becomes more understandable as a government political move. At the same time, 
General Paxton continues to push the ideas of more amphibious vessels but with much 
less success. And while the QDR and DSG are often held up as guideposts in the RAM 
and OB chapters, the GP model was effective in showing that there are some, like 
Congressman Forbes, who feel that these documents do not go far enough in defining the 
required capabilities of the armed forces. The GP model tells us the decision is the net 
result of the forces exerted by all the actors’ negotiations and bargaining. 
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Taken all together these models present a fascinating, complex, and more nuanced 
look at how the nation decides the future of the Navy. Both the decision-making process 
and the decision itself are complex. The three models provided different lenses to view 
the same decision. Apart, no lens presents the entire picture. Ultimately, analyzing any 
decision from multiple angles will yield new ideas and viewpoints not previously 
considered. By citing specific examples across the three models this thesis has 
highlighted the complexity of the document at a level not seen before.   
B. FURTHER AREAS OF RESEARCH 
The following areas have been identified as potential follow-on areas of research. 
1. A Detailed GP Model 
By far the biggest limitation with this approach is the lack of primary source data 
for the GP model. By conducting direct interviews with some of the identified players or 
performing a narrative content analysis of all public testimony related to the development 
of the shipbuilding plan using qualitative coding software, it would be possible to gain a 
behind the scenes view on developing the plan and thereby increase the understanding of 
the result. 
2. A Capabilities Based Approach to the 30-Year Plan 
While the capabilities requirement is already conducted at senior levels of 
government and independent research, it would be interesting to take the specific 
interests outlined in the DSG and QDR and pair them with the proposed ship 
procurement cycle to see if there is any correlation. 
3. A New Approach to Counting Ships 
Identified early on is the problem with counting Navy ships. While few would 
argue that a destroyer, an aircraft carrier, and a submarine are all Navy ships, the relative 
combat power and capability vary greatly. Is there perhaps a better way to count Navy 
vessels?   
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